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ABSTRACT 
 
Emily Smyth Cozart: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ONLINE SECONDARY 
TICKET MARKET AND COLLEGE ATHLETICS (under the direction Barbara Osborne, Esq.) 
 
 This study examined the relationship between the online secondary ticket market and 
college athletic departments.  A survey was emailed to the highest-ranking ticket office official at 
National Collegiate Athletic Association member institutions that are categorized as Football 
Bowl Subdivision.  The survey collected data on the existence of a formal contract between the 
athletic department and an online secondary ticket company; ticket office officials‘ opinions 
regarding the online secondary ticket company; and measured levels of agreement that certain 
factors had on the existence or non-existence of a formal contract between the athletic 
department and an online secondary ticket company. 
 Descriptive statistics were run on the collected data, and chi-square tests were run to 
determine if there were significant (p<0.05) relationships between athletic departments and the 
online secondary ticket market.  Descriptive statistics and chi-square results were analyzed and 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The online secondary ticket market‘s history begins with ticket scalpers.  Concern 
regarding the online secondary ticket market and its impact on ticket prices is a current and 
relevant issue facing both college athletic department administrators and college athletics 
fans.  Ticket scalpers first emerged in the late nineteenth century as people who would sell 
railroad tickets without authorization.  Ticket scalping transcended into entertainment when 
similar entrepreneurs began to scalp tickets to sold-out theater productions; scalpers would 
purchase large quantities of tickets and then try to sell them outside the venue at a premium.  
A ticket scalper refers to someone who buys a ticket at face value, and then attempts to resell 
it without permission at a higher price (Benitah, 2005). 
The practice of ticket scalping was technically illegal, but it also showed that there 
was money to be made through the resale of tickets, the price of which were originally set by 
promoters.  Ticket scalping then evolved into a legal practice of reselling tickets through 
ticket brokers.  Ticket brokers first emerged in the early twentieth century as remote outlets 
for theaters and ballparks, where customers could buy tickets without walking across town to 
buy in advance.  Brokers actually worked with promoters, in an effort to increase ticket sales, 
and returned unsold tickets to the box office, while retaining a small service fee.  Despite 
cooperation between event promoters and ticket brokers, illegal ticket scalping still existed 
(Benitah, 2005).   
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Beginning in 1905, anti-scalping legislation was drafted, and aimed to prevent harm 
to the event promoters and allow promoters to control the distribution of tickets.  Promoters 
typically set reasonable ticket prices in an effort to ensure sellouts, continue consumer 
goodwill and to stimulate demand (Benitah, 2005).  However, once tickets were resold on the 
internet, it became close to impossible for law enforcement to monitor and police.  Online 
secondary ticket sites such as EBay, post state laws on their site, but it is impossible to 
guarantee that ticket resellers and buyers abide by the laws, as most users do not post their 
real name or contact information (Drury, 2002).  
Enforcement of these laws is difficult.  For one, states do not have the monetary 
means needed to control ticket resale either around the venue or on the internet.  In addition, 
it can be argued that there is no victim in the act of ticket resale.  One party willingly sells, 
and another party willingly purchases.  No party reports a crime (Benitah, 2005).   
Currently, there are many websites that offer forums for customers to buy and resell 
athletic tickets (Short, 2005).  Online marketplaces include StubHub, TicketsNow and 
RazorGator (Johnson, 2007).  By reselling tickets on these online secondary ticket sites, 
many users violate their state‘s scalping laws.  Companies that operate these websites are not 
subject to anti-scalping enforcement because they claim the actual website is not breaking the 
law; rather, it is the users who are breaking their state‘s law (Short, 2005).  But it is difficult 
to correctly identify both the sellers and buyers, due to the fact that many online sellers do 
not list real names, phone numbers or addresses.  The best many online secondary ticket sites 
do is provide links to the laws in each state and depend on sellers and buyers to abide by the 
law (Drury, 2002).   
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The result of difficult enforcement by state authorities can lead to lawsuits.  One 
National Football League (NFL) team, the New England Patriots, aware of a thriving online 
market, tried to prohibit season ticket holders from reselling tickets online (Drury, 2002).  
The New England Patriots prohibited season ticket holders from reselling tickets, except 
through the team‘s official ticket exchange, which required sellers to charge face value 
(Mohl, 2007).  The Patriots argued season tickets were revocable licenses and, therefore, the 
organization could revoke season ticket holders‘ rights (NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc, 2007).  
The case went to court when the team sought to make StubHub, a major online secondary 
ticket marketplace, identify those who bought or resold season tickets through StubHub‘s 
site.  The team then wanted to use that information to cancel the season ticket holders‘ right 
to buy tickets, or report them to the authorities, as they were in violation of Massachusetts 
state law.  The court ruled in the Patriots‘ favor, giving the team the authority to acquire 
personal information from StubHub, and revoke ticket rights (NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 
2007). 
This case epitomizes the stigma attached to the online secondary ticket market as 
simply another means of ticket scalping.  Teams and leagues not only did not want to be a 
part of the market, but also tried to decrease incentive for fans to do business through them 
(Bell, 2006).  
Scalping used to be about burley men lurking outside stadiums reselling fistfuls of 
tickets (―Free-market Fleecing,‖ 2006).  Therefore, anti-scalping laws were designed to stop 
scalpers who harassed fans, charged high prices, and at times sold counterfeit tickets (Bell, 
2006).  But the internet has created a larger and more efficient marketplace.  Online 
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secondary ticket marketplaces created a new business model by bringing together buyers and 
sellers, and then taking a cut of the profits.  For instance, for each transaction, the popular 
online secondary ticket marketplace StubHub takes 25 percent of each transaction (―Free-
market Fleecing,‖ 2006).  By 2006, the value of tickets resold online was estimated to range 
from $2 to $6 billion (Johnson, 2007).  Online secondary ticket marketplaces were soon 
being acquired by larger brokering sites, due to the value of the online secondary ticket 
market.  In 2008, TicketsNow was bought by Ticketmaster for $265 million, while in 2007, 
StubHub was bought by EBay for $300 million (Nocera, 2008).     
The growth of the online secondary ticket market-and the potential for revenue-
caused owners and professional leagues to set aside initial objections in favor of pursuing 
these new revenues (Helyar, 2007).  The online secondary ticket market was useful not only 
to get tickets in the hands of fans who wanted to attend games, but, more importantly, to 
teams or franchises, there was the potential to receive a part of the revenues.  It was therefore 
monetarily beneficial for teams to run their own online secondary market (Nocera, 2008).   
In 2002, the owner of the Major League Baseball (MLB) team Chicago Cubs, the 
Tribune Company, created Wrigley Field Premium Ticket Services, which acted as a 
franchise-owned online secondary ticket market.  Tribune Company bought tickets from the 
Cubs, and then resold the tickets through Premium at the market price to the general public.  
For instance, box seat tickets to a 2003 Cubs-Yankees game, normally priced at $45, sold for 
up to $1,500 through Premium (Benitah, 2005). 
The Cubs said the company wanted to provide a service to get tickets into the hands 
of fans who wanted to attend, as well as protect fans from purchasing fraudulent tickets 
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(Siporin, 2004).  However, MLB was upset because the act of allowing Premium to buy 
tickets at face value and then resell at a profit meant Premium kept a bulk of the ticket 
profits, instead of giving back to the MLB as part of the league‘s revenue-sharing contract 
(Benitah, 2005).  Fans and scalpers were also upset because they argued that since Premium 
was so closely linked to the Cubs, the team was essentially scalping its own tickets (Siporin, 
2004).  Cubs fans sued in a class-action case that the team scalped its own tickets, and was, 
therefore, in violation of Illinois state law.  The judge ruled in favor of the Cubs, declaring 
that Premium was lawfully a separate corporation, and was the only beneficiary of online 
secondary ticket profits (Benitah, 2005). 
It was not long before other franchises began to establish ties with online secondary 
ticket companies and began receiving part of the profits.  In 2003, the MLB team Seattle 
Mariners joined with the online secondary ticket company, LiquidSeats, in an effort to act as 
the middleman between sellers and buyers, as well as collect commission on each 
transaction.  The team created the Ticket Marketplace, which allowed season ticket holders 
to resell their season tickets at market value.  For providing this service, the Mariners 
charged the buyer 15 percent of the final transaction price, and also 10 percent from the 
sellers (Benitah, 2005).  In 2008, the MLB team San Francisco Giants launched an online 
secondary ticket site, Fan-to-Fan Ticket Marketplace, which provided season ticket holders a 
chance to resell tickets through the Giants‘ official home site if they could not attend, and 
allowed them to price the tickets as determined by the market (―San Francisco Giants,‖ 
2008).  
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Meanwhile, it became increasingly obvious that the online secondary ticket market 
was too difficult to monitor and control, as far as anti-scalping law enforcement.  In addition, 
online secondary ticket companies began lobbying state legislatures to overturn anti-scalping 
laws (Nocera, 2008).  The repeal of many anti-scalping state laws helped professional teams 
and leagues in their search for this new revenue stream, and now all four professional leagues 
have online secondary ticket company deals (Helyar, 2007).   
The National Basketball Association (NBA) made the first move when they 
announced Ticketmaster as the official online secondary ticket market vendor in 2007.  The 
MLB made the next contractual agreement, by signing a $250 million deal with StubHub for 
five years (Helyar, 2007).  Most recently, NFL.com and Ticketmaster.com started ―NFL 
Ticket Exchange,‖ which is the league‘s first official online secondary ticket company.  
During the previous season, the NFL sold more than 22 million tickets to all games, 
including the post-season and the Super Bowl.  The league does not provide specific ticket 
data, but predicts five to 10 percent of those tickets moved to the online secondary ticket 
market (McCarthy, 2008).  The terms for each contract vary by league.  In the NFL, 
Ticketmaster will pay $100 million over five years.  Of the 32 teams in the NFL, ten already 
have deals with other sites, and will continue those until those contracts expire.  The 
sponsorship deals between leagues and online secondary ticket companies basically give a 
stamp of approval to a business leagues once regarded with disapproval.  Professional 
leagues realized they could capitalize on online secondary ticket profits, and also exert some 
control over it (Helyar, 2007).   
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The online secondary ticket market for college athletic tickets is just as prevalent.  
The rise of the online secondary ticket market has expanded sales by making it easier for 
resellers and buyers to find one another (―If you can‘t beat ‗em, join ‗em,‖ 2007).  In the past, 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and college athletic departments have 
not profited from the secondary ticket market, and have maintained a strong stance against 
unregulated scalping.  The NCAA strictly prohibits ticket resale by athletes, employees, and 
college chancellors and presidents.  Those with an NCAA affiliation are allowed to purchase 
tickets, but cannot resell above face value (Johnson, 2008).   
Recently athletic departments, athletic conferences and the NCAA itself began 
receiving part of the profits by signing revenue-sharing deals with online secondary ticket 
companies.  Event organizers can refer ticketless fans to the online sites with which they 
have a contract, thus ensuring the legitimacy of the marketplace.  In return, online secondary 
ticket company shares the profit of resold tickets with the event organizers (―If you can‘t beat 
‗em, join ‗em,‖ 2007). 
StubHub broke into collegiate online secondary sales in 2006, when West Virginia 
Athletics chose the company over three other online secondary ticket companies.  The five-
year contract and sponsorship fee gave the company advertising and signage rights inside 
Mountaineer Stadium and on the official athletics website (Biertempfel, 2006).  StubHub also 
has contracts with the following college athletic departments: Texas A&M, Southern 
Mississippi, San Jose State, Purdue, St. John‘s, Arizona, University of Southern California, 
California, Georgetown, Stanford, Oregon State, and Rutgers (―NCAA Basketball Tickets,‖ 
2008). 
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In 2006, Penn State Athletics Department was the first NCAA school to sign an 
online secondary ticket market deal with Ticketmaster.  Season ticket holders are able to 
resell unused season tickets through Nittany Lion Ticket Exchange, which is powered by 
Ticketmaster.  Penn State then receives a 15 percent fee on every transaction.  This is viewed 
by Penn State Athletics as a legal, efficient and profitable means of getting tickets into the 
hands of fans who want to come to the game (Biertempfel, 2006). 
It is understandable that organizations or teams would want to profit from the online 
secondary ticket marketplace.  Sport teams and leagues have learned they cannot stop ticket 
reselling, but they can fight for a share of the market.  RazorGator, for instance, charges a fee 
of up to 25 percent on each NCAA ticket resold through its website.  This means the NCAA 
and RazorGator share as much as $454 if a patron spends $1,819 for the highest-priced ticket 
available prior to the Final Four (Johnson, 2007).   
In 2006, the NCAA announced a partnership with RazorGator and Fan2Fan Ticket 
Exchange as its official online secondary ticket provider, beginning with the 2007 NCAA 
Men‘s Final Four.  As one of the most popular sporting events in the country, NCAA Men‘s 
Final Four tickets are in high demand.  The NCAA entered the ticket agreement in an attempt 
to curb unauthorized sale of Final Four tickets, which, in the view of the NCAA, not only 
limits revenue for student-athlete programs, but also put fans at risk in the form of counterfeit 
tickets (―NCAA Selects RazorGator,‖ 2006).   
Through RazorGator, fans who plan to forgo either the Final Four semifinals or 
championship game can auction their tickets to the highest online bidder.  Therefore, tickets 
are resold for over the face value.  As part of the agreement, the NCAA receives a portion of 
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the revenue from online secondary ticket sales.  Proceeds go toward the overall revenue of 
the NCAA, which is distributed to its member institutions (Garcia, 2006).  In 2008, with 
tickets provided by the NCAA, RazorGator offered dozens of seats in the lower arena of the 
Alamodome at five times the face value of $220.  The NCAA did not disclose how many 
tickets were available to RazorGator, how much revenue is generated, or the percentage of 
profits that went to the NCAA (Brown, 2008). 
On one hand, this approach makes sense for all parties concerned.  The online 
secondary ticket market is an efficient way to segment the market, rather than fans acquiring 
tickets through unauthorized resellers (―If you can‘t beat ‗em, join ‗em,‖ 2007).  However, 
the fact that tickets are resold over face value and that select online secondary ticket 
companies are sanctioned by the NCAA does not always sit well with the general public or 
college athletic administrators.  There exists a perception that the NCAA is promoting the 
resale of tickets for more than face value for the sole purpose of making more money.  The 
dilemma facing the NCAA is to try to capture profits made in the online secondary ticket 
market, while dealing with ethical questions surrounding any endorsement of the online 
secondary ticket industry (Garcia, 2006).   
Ticket sales in college athletics are vital to athletic departments and the NCAA.  The 
NCAA Men‘s Basketball Final Four brings in the vast majority of the NCAA‘s revenues; 
subsequently, those revenues are dispersed to member institutions and conferences 
(McCarthy, 2008).   In 2007, the men‘s basketball tournament generated $503 million in 
television revenue and $47 million in ticket sales (McCarthy, 2008).  Almost 90 percent of 
the NCAA‘s revenue comes from that money, with the majority of it going back to NCAA 
10 
 
member schools.  Specifically, the NCAA pays the travel expenses during the tournament for 
participants (up to 100 people), and also pays each team‘s conference $191,000 each of the 
next six years for every game won, up to five games (Brown, 2008).   
Yet some Final Four participating teams actually lose money during the men‘s 
basketball tournament.  In 2008, the NCAA tournament generated $614 million.  The largest 
source of that revenue is the television rights fee paid by CBS and ESPN.  The NCAA uses 
five percent of that revenue for administrative expenses, and the remaining revenue goes to 
member schools and conferences.  However, in 2008, Final Four participants voiced concern 
over requirements to pay for unwanted goods and services, such as hotel rooms and a 
NCAA-sponsored party that cost $32,000.  The issue that generated the most controversy 
centered on the NCAA‘s deal with the online secondary ticket site RazorGator and Fan2Fan 
Ticket Exchange.  In 2008, the number of Final Four tickets allocated to each team decreased 
at the same time the NCAA was reselling prime tickets through RazorGator.  For the 2008 
Final Four, participants received 3,750 tickets, down from 4,500 in 2003.  To further fuel 
controversy, the NCAA did not disclose how many tickets were available to RazorGator, 
how much the sponsorship fee was worth, or the percentage of ticket revenue split between 
the two parties (Kobritz, 2008).  Additionally, college athletic directors were not briefed on 
decreases in their university‘s ticket allotments nor the requirement to pay for the NCAA-
sponsored party (Brown, 2008). 
Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationships between the online 
secondary ticket market and NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision members. 
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Research Questions 
1. What is the relationship between NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision ticket offices and 
the online secondary ticket market? 
2. Why do college athletic ticket offices have or do not have contracts with online 
secondary ticket companies? 
3. Do college athletic departments have a formal internal ticket return program run by 
the athletic ticket office and/or fundraising office? 
4. What is the opinion of NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision ticket office officials 
regarding the online secondary ticket market? 
5. Is there a relationship between the ticket office‘s status with the online secondary 
ticket market and the ticket office official‘s opinion regarding the online secondary 
ticket market? 
6. Is there a relationship between sold out games per season in football and men‘s 
basketball, and the ticket office‘s status with the online secondary ticket market? 
Definition of Terms 
Ticket scalping is defined as reselling tickets to entertainment or sporting events at the price 
dictated by the marketplace.  The popularity of the event dictates whether scalping occurs 
and the price of the ticket (Bell, 2006).   
Secondary ticket market is a marketplace in which tickets are purchased from the sponsoring 
organization or venue, and then resold either above or below the ticket‘s original cost.  The 
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secondary market occurs because seats are sold in advance of events (Happel & Jennings, 
1995).  This study examines the secondary ticket market on the internet. 
The NCAA is an acronym for the National Collegiate Athletic Association.  The NCAA is 
the governing body for college athletic departments, and has legislative and enforcement 
functions (www.ncaa.org). 
Football Bowl Subdivision is also known as Division I-A and BCS.  These universities have 
athletic departments that sponsor football, and also average at least 15,000 people in actual or 
paid attendance (www.ncaa.org).  
Face value refers to the cost of a ticket, as set by the event organizer.  The face value is the 
cost that is actually printed on the ticket (Bell, 2006). 
Market value refers the price set by the demand for an event.   High demand for an event 
tends to create a higher price for which a fan will purchase a ticket; low demand for an event 
may drive the price below face value of the ticket (Benitah, 2005). 
Assumptions 
 The main assumption in this study is the online secondary ticket market and its 
impact on ticket prices is a relevant issue in college athletics. 
 This study also assumes the highest-ranking employee in the athletic ticket office will 
answer the survey, will do so honestly and is knowledgeable about the online 
secondary ticket market. 
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 This study assumes the highest-ranking employee in the athletic ticket office is 
responsible for making decisions regarding the relationship with online secondary 
ticket companies. 
Delimitations 
The delimitation in this study is the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision ticket office 
managers, assistant athletic directors for tickets, or associate athletic directors for tickets that 
answer the survey.  The study is limited to the accuracy of their perspective, as well as their 
knowledge of issues surrounding the online secondary ticket marketplace. 
Limitations 
 This study is limited by the number of surveys completed, or the survey‘s response 
rate. 
 The survey only accounts for perspectives from Football Bowl Subdivision ticket 
office managers, assistant athletic directors for tickets, associate athletic directors for 
tickets, whoever is the higher ranking employee in the athletic ticket office.  The 
study does not take into account ticket office managers, assistant athletic directors for 
tickets, or associate athletic directors for tickets from Football Championship 
Subdivision, Division II, Division III, or non-NCAA entities. 
 The survey‘s validity is based on the assumption that the ticket office manager, 
assistant athletic director for tickets, or associate athletic director for tickets is the 
person in the athletic department who makes decisions regarding the online secondary 
ticket market. 
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 The study is limited by the newness of online secondary ticket market technology, 
and ticket office managers‘, assistant athletic directors for tickets‘, associate athletic 
directors for tickets‘ familiarity with the technology and business of the online 
secondary ticket market.   
 The study is limited if NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision ticket offices cannot 
support a contract with an online secondary market due to lack of athletic department 
funding and technical support. 
Significance of Study 
This thesis is significant because the online secondary ticket market and its 
relationship to college athletics raise ethical and legal concerns.  But the relationship also 
may demonstrate a trend toward acceptance of the online secondary ticket market as a new 
revenue stream.   
As the governing body of college athletics, the NCAA is the face of amateurism, and 
helps set the policies among its member institutions.  According to Greg Shaheen, NCAA 
senior vice-president for basketball and business strategies, the NCAA agreement with 
RazorGator is a strategic step to reaffirm and elevate their commitment to their fan base, 
member schools and other organizations who desire the NCAA Final Four experience 
(―NCAA Selects RazorGator‖, 2006).  But what message is delivered when the NCAA 
makes a formal agreement with a business that resells tickets for more than face value, and 
gives a certain percentage of those profits to the NCAA?  In the past, NCAA Final Four 
tickets remained a bargain in the athletic ticket world, comparatively.  For the 2008 Final 
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Four in San Antonio, face value of a lower level ticket was $220, compared to the 2008 
Super Bowl, where the top ticket price was $900.  But, a week prior to the event, Final Four 
tickets were being resold by RazorGator for $2,500 or more (Johnson, 2008). 
There is also revenue to be generated, however, which can go back to the NCAA 
member institutions.  With the majority of revenue from the NCAA men‘s basketball 
tournament going back to the member institutions, the NCAA has to make an effort to 
capture the revenues made through the online secondary ticket market (Brown, 2008).  In a 
2006 deal with Ticketmaster, Penn State was able to obtain 15 percent on every ticket sale—
money the athletic department would not have had before.  In addition, making unused 
tickets available helps retain customers and increases satisfaction of customer bases 
(Biertempfel, 2006). 
The online secondary ticket market is a significant issue facing college athletics.  In 
the past, event promoters sought to eliminate ticket scalping and lobbied for anti-scalping 
legislation (Benitah, 2005).  But the stance of the NCAA and college athletic departments on 
online ticket scalping is no longer clear (Johnson, 2007).  The NCAA once frowned on the 
reselling of tickets at inflated prices, but is now actively involved in the practice through a 
contract with an online secondary ticket company (Brown, 2008).  Sports leagues, college 
teams, professional sports teams, concert promoters and entertainers are trying to control-and 
profit from-the online ticket resale market (Johnson, 2007).  It can be said that the NCAA 
and its member institutions are simply taking advantage of the rules of supply and demand, 
where free trade allows patrons to sell items at whatever price they can receive (Benitah, 
2005).  However, it can also be said that the NCAA and member institutions are walking a 
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narrow ethical and legal line by sanctioning an illegal practice in states, and eliminating 
accessibility to view the country‘s most popular amateur event to all but the wealthy fans 
(McCarthy, 2008). 
The growth of the internet has created an environment where ticket scalping is even 
easier and more efficient.  Ticket resellers and buyers can conduct business anywhere, 
anytime, as long as they have internet access, which has helped make the online secondary 
ticket market a billion dollar industry.  In addition, it is a relatively anonymous way of 
scalping for brokers, and carries much less risk of being caught conducting an illegal activity 
(Benitah, 2005).  
The combination of the popularity of college athletics, legislative efforts to curb 
online ticket reselling, and the wide scope and anonymity of the internet warrants a 
theoretical and statistical analysis of the online secondary ticket market.  There is little to no 
published research on the online secondary ticket market and its relationship with college 
athletics.  This thesis strives to discover online secondary ticket market‘s relationship at 
NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision member institutions, where limited numbers of tickets for 
revenue-producing sports are in high demand.   
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 To fully understand the intricacies of the online secondary ticket market and its 
importance relevant to college athletics, this chapter will review related historical literature, 
legal cases, academic research and industry publications.  First, the ticket scalping process 
and the history of ticket scalping will be reviewed.  Next, this paper addresses the public 
policy effects of ticket scalping and anti-scalping legislation.  This section examines the 
proponent‘s and opponent‘s views of anti-scalping legislation.  That discussion transitions 
into the roles the judicial and legislative branches have on anti-scalping measures.  Then 
recent legal trends and the impact of the internet on the secondary ticket market will be 
reviewed.  College athletics and the relationships with the online secondary ticket market is 
discussed next, followed by a review of economic reasons that support the existence of a 
secondary market, and existing academic research and industry publications. 
The Ticket Scalping Process 
Ticket scalping is the reselling of tickets to entertainment or sporting events at a price 
determined by the marketplace.  The popularity of the event determines whether scalping 
occurs and the price of the ticket (Bell, 2006). 
A scalper purchases tickets directly from the promoter at face value, then waits until 
the event is sold out.  The scalper then resells the ticket to consumers; the higher the demand, 
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the higher the profits for the scalper.  Because many fans are willing to buy at a higher price 
than that set by the promoter, scalpers can expect relative success in their business.  Ticket 
scalping revenue is largely unreported, but estimates range from $2 to $14 billion generated 
by the online secondary ticket market (Bell, 2006).  
There are three methods of reselling a ticket on the secondary ticket market.  The first 
is to sell on the street at the event venue.  This practice is viewed as disruptive and raises 
public safety concerns.  The second method is to resell as a licensed ticket broker.  With a 
license, in some states, ticket brokering is legal.  Those with licenses are permitted to buy 
tickets in the primary market, and then resell tickets above face value, usually up to a certain 
maximum price (Bell, 2006).   
Third, scalpers can sell tickets through an online auction or online ticket site.  Ticket 
scalping legislation also applies to online transactions, though the legislation depends on 
where the buyer or seller reside, as well as the state‘s laws, or lack thereof (Cianfrone & 
Connaughton, 2004).  Online sites are referred to as a marketplace, in order to differentiate 
themselves from ticket brokers.  Online marketplaces do not buy tickets and resell to bidders, 
but rather facilitate ticket resale by providing a secure environment where sellers post tickets 
and negotiate with buyers to reach a market-clearing price.  Online sites typically charge a 
percentage fee from buyers and sellers, or a flat membership fee.  They also earn revenue by 
generating enough internet traffic to attract advertisement deals (Short, 2006). 
Emergence of Ticket Scalping 
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Ticket scalpers began as people who resold railroad tickets without authorization in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  The railroad offered a discount when a 
patron purchased a round-trip ticket, so scalpers would resell the unused portions.  Later, 
people used a similar entrepreneurial approach to resell tickets to the theater.  Theater ticket 
scalpers, then known as ticket speculators, bought large quantities of tickets and then resold 
them outside the venue for a profit.  Today, a ticket scalper is known as a person who buys a 
ticket at or below face value and tries to resell it at a higher price (Benitah, 2005). 
Event promoters lobbied for anti-scalping legislation in order to protect their business 
goals.  Promoters typically set ticket prices low to continue customer goodwill, ensure sell-
outs and stimulate demand.  At the time, promoters argued they had the right to control the 
distribution of tickets to their events.  To address theater ticket scalping, the United States 
legislature passed acts prohibiting the resale of entertainment tickets for an amount greater 
than the original price charged.  As far back as 1905, the legislature passed acts prohibiting 
the resale of tickets to places of amusement for an amount greater than face value.  However, 
ticket scalpers challenged the statutes on constitutional grounds, and early decisions by the 
court found in favor of ticket scalpers.  Later, courts upheld state anti-scalping legislation on 
the grounds of the legislations‘ efforts to promote citizen goodwill (Benitah, 2005).  The 
history of anti-scalping legislation, along with specific case studies is reviewed in the 
historical segment of this chapter. 
Currently, there is no federal legislation regarding ticket scalping (Cianfrone & 
Connaughton, 2004).  The closest move toward federal legislation was in 1998. Congressman 
Gary Ackerman, a Democrat from New York, tried to introduce the Ticket Scalping 
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Reduction Act, which called for the prohibition of sales of five or more tickets in a single 
transaction at a markup over $5.00 or 10 percent of the face value, whichever was greater.  
Not one congress member co-sponsored the bill, thus no hearings were ever held on 
Ackerman‘s bill (Happel & Jennings, 2002). 
Public Policy 
Most experts agree that government intervention in the market process should pass 
some efficiency criteria.  But one form of intervention both economists, judges and 
lawmakers find tricky are anti-scalping laws, which aim to limit the resale of tickets to 
sporting and entertainment events to prevent a secondary market from charging high prices 
and a potentially unfair ticket distribution (Depken, 2005). 
On one hand, there are those who call for extensive ticket market legislation for 
egalitarian purposes: to protect the public from extortion, and ensure public access to 
entertainment and sporting events (Happel & Jennings, 2002).  The opposing argument states 
ticket resale increases efficiency by channeling tickets to consumers who value them the 
most, and the market demand should set the price (Courty, 2003). 
Proponents of Anti-Scalping Legislation: Protect the Promoter and Consumer 
State legislatures passed laws curbing or prohibiting ticket scalping, in reaction to the 
negative connotations associated with ticket scalping.  Laws have permitted scalping in some 
form, such as regulating where tickets can be resold, limiting who can engage in ticket resale 
and capping the amount for which the ticket can be sold above face value.  Other laws 
prohibit ticket resale altogether (Bell, 2006). 
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The first phase of anti-scalping laws began with an attempt to curb the unauthorized 
activities of on-site scalpers.  At state and local levels, anti-scalping laws were passed, but 
enforcement was sporadic.  The next phase of scalping laws sought to segment on-site 
scalpers from ticket brokers.  Statutes legalized licenses to brokers, thus giving them 
permission to resell tickets if they met certain licensing criteria (Happel & Jennings, 1995). 
The most common argument in favor of anti-scalping legislation is the protection of 
the promoter and consumer.  Ticket promoters intentionally set ticket costs low to ensure 
tickets are available to the general public, and to achieve a sold out event (Criscuolo, 1995).  
However, if ticket scalpers exhaust the box office supply and take away tickets that 
consumers could have purchased at face value, the unavailability of tickets at a decent price 
may damage a promoter‘s goodwill with customers (Bell, 2006).  In the long run, if tickets 
are unavailable, consumers become dissatisfied with the promoter, which can eventually lead 
to a drop in ticket sales (Criscuolo, 1995).  Whether it is fair or not to the event promoter, the 
increase in the price of admission charged by the scalper tends to reflect negatively on the 
promoter, since the consumer is forced to pay a higher price to a sold out event.  This creates 
an environment of tension and distrust between the consumer and promoter (Bell, 2006). 
In addition, promoters claim that scalpers unfairly capitalize off their product when 
there is high demand for the ticket.  Promoters also dislike unregulated scalpers when there is 
low demand for tickets.  In this situation, when the box office has available tickets, scalpers 
may charge below face value to the consumer.  Therefore, the promoter is, again, left with 
unrealized profits, if they cannot sell tickets at the box office (Happel & Jennings, 1995).  
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Adding to their irritation, promoters become discouraged with ticket scalpers because many 
do not pay taxes on their profit gains (Bell, 2006). 
Ticket scalping can also be harmful to the consumer.  The most common argument in 
consumer protection is prevention of price gouging by ticket scalpers (Criscuolo, 1995).  
Usually ticket scalpers are most prevalent during post-season, opening night and weekend 
athletic events.  As these tickets are in high demand, the resale price increases, making it 
more costly to see an event (Bell, 2006).  Proponents of anti-ticket scalping legislation 
contend the profit scalpers make is unfair, due to the low prices set by the promoter in the 
first place.  Again, when scalpers and brokers can obtain regularly priced tickets and then 
charge over face value, it leads to an unequal and unfair allocation of tickets (Cianfrone & 
Connaughton, 2004).  There is also the concern for fraud by scalpers and its effect on the 
public safety of the consumer.  Anti-scalping legislation intends to help curb fake tickets sold 
by unregulated ticket scalpers (Bell, 2006), while it also aims to curb harassment toward fans 
by scalpers outside of the arena (Criscuolo, 1995). 
Opponents of Anti-Ticket Scalping Legislation 
The most prevalent criticism of anti-scalping legislation is that it does not work and 
attempts to enforce legislation are futile.  Even though courts uphold anti-scalping laws, they 
are nearly impossible for city and state officials to enforce because laws lack uniformity, and 
states and municipalities lack the resources to enforce them (Criscuolo, 1995). 
The lack in uniformity in state laws creates loopholes for scalpers to operate 
(Criscuolo, 1995).  For instance, scalpers can resell tickets online to and from states where 
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ticket scalping is legal, or they can sell an item along with the tickets, if tickets cannot be 
resold in that state.  Depending on the state‘s legislation, if the ticket is resold as a part of a 
package, the transaction is legal (Benitah, 2005). 
Enforcement of anti-scalping legislation is difficult.  States and municipalities simply 
do not have the time or money to track online ticket scalpers or scalpers who resell tickets at 
the event site (Benitah, 2005).  Only federal law may regulate interstate commerce.  So, a 
transaction occurring between two parties who reside in states with different laws are more 
difficult to regulate because of jurisdiction issues (Elfenbein, 2006).  Also, part of the 
problem facing ticket scalping enforcement is it can be perceived as a victimless crime.  The 
transaction is consensual: there is a willing seller and a willing buyer.  If there is no victim to 
report an alleged crime, then authorities cannot prosecute (Benitah, 2005). 
The other argument against anti-scalping legislation is it is an exercise of free 
enterprise and should not be regulated by the government (Criscuolo, 1995).  Scalping is 
inevitable as long as there are both advance ticket sales for events and consumer pressure to 
keep prices affordable to the general public (Happel & Jennings, 1995).  When a promoter 
chooses to sell tickets at a value less than the market-clearing price and chooses not to attain 
additional profits, it does not create automatic privilege for the consumer to receive tickets at 
the low price.  Additionally, when a promoter chooses to set the ticket price below the 
market-clearing price, this creates conditions for a secondary ticket market.  If there is high 
demand for a sporting event, and tickets are available at reasonable prices, scalpers are able 
to purchase tickets at face value, and resell them to fans who did not buy tickets from the 
promoter in time (Benitah, 2005). 
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Proponents for legislation argue that anti-scalping legislation prevents fans from 
paying exorbitant prices for tickets.  However, this assumes that all tickets-at face value-are 
affordable for all consumers.  Even in the primary market, ticket prices have increased to 
points that are unaffordable.  Thus, attempts to control the prices on the secondary market are 
ineffective (Mohl, June 2007). 
The main reason scalpers are popular is because demand for tickets exceeds the 
supply.  When this occurs, those who have the product create a secondary market, in which 
they are willing to part with the ticket for a monetary value (Benitah, 2005).  From the view 
of the consumer, scalpers can save them time and energy in terms of acquiring a ticket for a 
sold out event (Bell, 2006).  This is beneficial for those consumers who need tickets and are 
willing to pay more for them (Cianfrone & Connaughton, 2004).  Opponents of anti-scalping 
legislation argue any law that interferes with the free market practice is unconstitutional 
(Criscuolo, 1995). 
However, it is important to note the Constitution does not guarantee the right to free 
enterprise, and the right to conduct business may be conditioned.  The courts have 
consistently held that it is within the power of state to regulate businesses, if they find the 
general public is disadvantaged.  If the law‘s approach is applied with the intent to ensure 
public good and is not arbitrary or discriminatory, it does not violate the Constitution 
(Criscuolo, 1995). 
From the promoter‘s perspective, scalpers are beneficial for two reasons.  First, 
tickets purchased by scalpers are guaranteed revenue.  For a high demand event, with a 
limited supply of tickets, a promoter can be confident that tickets will be purchased in 
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advance, even if they are purchased by a scalper.  Second, scalpers help maximize revenue 
by getting tickets into consumers‘ hands.  If the event is sold out, and those who want tickets 
at late notice can still acquire tickets, the event can still maximize revenues from 
concessions, parking and merchandise sales (Bell, 2006).  The more fans at the event means 
more profits for all parties involved with the event.  Profits from these other sources can 
offset money that could have been made if promoters raised ticket prices to the market level 
(Benitah, 2005). 
Indirectly, there is another benefit for promoters.  The perception of a sold out event 
enhances the popularity of the event for consumers and attracts some consumers to the 
marketplace who would not otherwise attend.  Just the allure of being able to be a part of an 
event that not everyone gets to attend fuels some consumers‘ need to acquire tickets.  
Bragging rights come at a cost, but it a cost many consumers are willing to pay.  Thus, 
demand for the event is driven even higher by this consumer mentality (Bell, 2006). 
History of Anti-Scalping Legislation 
 It has long been argued that the practice of ticket scalping causes far too many 
problems for the sport and entertainment industries.  According to Criscuolo (1995), ticket 
scalping creates an unequal distribution of tickets, since ticket scalpers can purchase tickets 
from the promoter for the purpose of making a profit through the secondary market.  Only 
those with more disposable income can afford the scalper‘s resale prices.  Thus, individuals 
who cannot afford the resale price are unable attend the event meaning not everyone has a 
fair shot at obtaining a ticket (Criscuolo, 1995). 
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 Additionally, ticket scalping in or around the arena may be dangerous and disruptive 
to fans.  Scalpers who resell tickets in the venue area create congestion, which leads to 
concerns regarding the harassment to fans, as well as the sale of fraudulent tickets (Criscuolo, 
1995).  The stigma of big burley men lurking outside arenas with fistfuls of tickets again 
comes to mind, thus making the event potentially less enjoyable for fans (―Free-market 
Fleecing,‖ 2006).   
 In reaction to the negative connotation surrounding ticket scalping, state legislators 
began passing anti-scalping legislation as early as 1907 (Bell, 2006).  In 1907, Illinois 
adopted a law that prohibited the resale of tickets for more than the amount printed on the 
ticket.  This law applied to theater and other entertainment events (Siporin, 2004).  Over 
time, as state legislatures set their own legislation, anti-scalping laws varied from state to 
state.   The majority permitted the resale of tickets in some form, but set regulations as far as 
where tickets could be resold, limits on who could engage in ticket scalping, and set a 
maximum amount for which a ticket could be resold (Bell, 2006).  For instance, California 
prohibited the act of reselling tickets on the grounds of an arena where an event was held.  
Other states, such as Georgia and Connecticut were more lenient in restricting the secondary 
ticket market.  These states prohibited the reselling of tickets at a price greater than the value 
printed on the ticket, but allowed an increase in price to cover taxes and service fees 
(Criscuolo, 1995). 
 Other states attempted to regulate the secondary ticket market through licensure.  In 
New Jersey, it was forbidden for a person to engage in ticket scalping unless that individual 
had a license to resell tickets.  In Alabama and New York, a person who wished to resell 
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tickets was required to get a license and pay a fee for the license.  Ohio state lawmakers 
allowed municipal corporations to regulate, by license or other means, the act of reselling 
tickets to theater and amusement events (Criscuolo, 1995). 
 As of 2007, 42 states had repealed anti-scalping legislation (Jacoby, 2007).  New 
York State, one of the most recent states to repeal anti-scalping legislation, did so in 2007.  
Then-governor Eliot Spitzer, stating that anti-scalping legislation did not work, signed a bill 
in June deregulating the resale of tickets to theaters, concerts and athletic events.  Spitzer 
went on to state that New York would allow the free market to determine ticket resale prices, 
thus completely allowing the resale of tickets above face value (Jacoby, 2007).   
The trend toward deregulating the secondary ticket market by state government begs 
the question: how does this trend affect college athletic departments?  As college athletic 
ticket offices and the NCAA now endorse and enter contract agreements with online 
secondary ticket companies, thus engaging in a profit-making manner similar to the exact 
behavior they once tried to prohibit, they enter into a public policy debate over the 
accessibility of athletic tickets (Bell, 2006). 
Legislature versus Judicial Views: A History of Case Law 
The researcher was unable to find documented legal cases that involved college 
athletic fans or college athletic departments.  However, the researcher feels a brief history of 
anti-scalping legislation and judicial views is pertinent, as it helps provide a history regarding 
the stigma that follows the secondary ticket market.  
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The court faces four issues when reviewing the legality of anti-scalping legislation 
and whether those issues fall within the interest of the state: protection of public welfare; 
ensuring public access; the state‘s police power; and the relationship between the legislative 
goals and enforcement of the law (Pittman & Osborne, 2003). 
Early challenges to anti-scalping statutes focused on the legality of the state‘s police 
power.  During this time, anti-scalping laws were struck down as a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the 14
th
 Amendment and as a violation of property rights.  Ticket 
scalping was considered to be a private industry, thus courts held that state legislatures were 
overreaching their boundaries by regulating the business.  In addition, the courts determined 
ticket scalping was not an area of public interest, so the law invaded both the rights of 
property and freedom of contract (Bell, 2006). 
Tyson and Brothers v. Banton (1927) 
In Tyson and Brothers v. Banton, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a state 
statute prohibiting the resale of theater tickets or other entertainment tickets for more than 
$0.50 over face value.  The court reversed the New York district court‘s decision that denied 
ticket brokers the chance to resell theater tickets.  The court held the power to fix prices by 
the government exists only if the business involved has a public interest.  The court did not 
find the resale of tickets was such a business, thus the state‘s regulation was a violation of the 
due process clause of the 14
th
 Amendment (Tyson v. Banton, 1927).  In order to be upheld, 
the law had to pass the ―Rational Basis‖ test, which states the law must be rationally related 
to a legitimate government interest.  In Tyson v. Banton the court found the anti-scalping law 
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unconstitutional because it was arbitrarily enforced, which violated equal protection (Tyson 
v. Banton, 1927). 
Nebbia v. New York (1934) 
That view regarding state economic regulations ended with the court‘s decision in 
Nebbia v. New York, which has since set the court‘s rationale when deciding anti-scalping 
cases (Cianfrone & Connaughton, 2004).  In Nebbia v. New York, the court found the 
government‘s power to fix prices was a valid exercise of the state‘s police power.  As the law 
was instilled to promote a public interest, the state legislature was free to adopt any economic 
policy deemed necessary, as long as it is reasonably related to promoting public good.  
Therefore, the state‘s regulation of the use, or price of the use of one‘s property, was not 
necessarily a violation of due process (Bell, 2006).   
Gold v. DiCarlo (1965) 
Regarding anti-scalping legislation, courts have recognized the state has a legitimate 
interest in protecting public welfare in terms of public access to tickets and public safety 
(Criscuolo, 1995).  In Gold v. DiCarlo, a New York statute that regulated the price at which 
licensed brokers could resell tickets was challenged but upheld by a state court (Gold v. 
DiCarlo, 1965).  New York state law restricted the resale of tickets to only $1.50 over face 
value (Bell, 2006).  The law was challenged by ticket brokers, who argued the state could not 
regulate the resale of tickets to public events.  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, citing the 
Nebbia case, affirmed the state court‘s ruling.   Regulating resale prices is a matter of public 
interest because it affects the price the public had to pay (Gold v. DiCarlo, 1965).  The court 
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has found if the law promoted public welfare, is applied fairly and enforcement 
accommodated the legislative purpose, the state was free to adopt whatever economic policy 
needed (Criscuolo, 1995).   
The State v. Major et al (1979) 
 Other challenges to anti-scalping legislation have included the claim that such statutes 
violate the private property right of disposing one‘s property.  In State v. Major (1979), the 
defendants accused of scalping tickets to an Atlanta Falcons football game at an illegal price 
used this as their defense.  The court, however, has continued to rely on Nebbia v. New York 
(1934), and found the anti-scalping statute to be reasonably related to the legitimate state 
interest in the regulation of the resale price of tickets (State v. Major, 1979). 
 In reviewing the power of the state to regulate business practices, the Nebbia court 
found, regarding due process and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, states are 
free to adopt economic policies that reasonably promote public welfare.  When applied to 
this case, if the anti-scalping legislation has a reasonable relationship to a legislation purpose, 
the requirements of due process are satisfied.  Therefore, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized a legitimate state interest in the regulation of the resale price of tickets in an 
effort to put all sports fans on an equal level in acquiring tickets (State v. Major, 1979). 
State of Connecticut v. John M. Leary (1991) 
Courts also have upheld the distinction made in the treatment of brokers who do have 
permission from the promoter to resell and those who do not have permission (Criscuolo, 
1995).  In State of Connecticut v. John M. Leary (1991), the court held the state‘s anti-
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scalping legislation did not violate due process or equal protection.  Connecticut law stated 
scalpers could not charge more than $3.00 over face value of the ticket.  However, the statute 
did allow event promoters to enter into contracts with brokers, who charged over face value.  
The defendant claimed the law benefited a select group, which violated his rights to equal 
protection (State v. Leary, 1991). 
In State, the Connecticut Supreme Court held the law was reasonably related to its 
intention to promote access, protect public welfare and prevent economic loss (State v. Leary, 
1991).  The law was not a violation of equal protection because the need for ticket scalping 
regulation was demonstrated (Criscuolo, 1995).  Since the owner was free to enter into 
contractual relations regarding the resale of tickets, the exemption was appropriate (State v. 
Leary, 1991). 
People v. Shepard (1978) 
In terms of protecting public safety, the courts recognize anti-scalping legislation 
intends to provide a safe environment for events, and decrease annoyance, congestion and 
harassment by on-site scalpers.  In People v. Shepard (1978), the court found anti-scalping 
legislation was reasonable because the government had an interest in protecting citizens‘ 
well-being.  In the case, the defendant was arrested for scalping tickets to a Los Angeles 
Raiders football game outside L.A. Memorial Coliseum.  Ticket scalping was illegal within 
city limits and in areas of public entertainment use.  When the scalper challenged the 
legislation violated the equal protection clause of the 14
th
 Amendment, the court disagreed.  
The court held the anti-scalping law was created to eliminate the intrusion of the scalper and 
the scalper‘s negative impact on public safety (Cianfrone & Connaughton, 2004).  The state 
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had an interest in ensuring public access, which was the intent of the legislation.  Thus, the 
law was within the power of the state (Criscuolo, 1995). 
New Jersey Association of Ticket Brokers and Birn-Mar Tickets, Inc. v. Ticketron (1988) 
The growth of the ticket broker industry led to another challenge to the state courts 
regarding anti-scalping legislation.  The New Jersey Association of Ticket Brokers (New 
Jersey Association), an unincorporated association of ticket brokers operating in New Jersey, 
along with Birn-Mar Tickets, Inc., a New Jersey corporation engaged in the ticket brokerage 
business, challenged the New Jersey state law that stated each ticket could not be resold for 
more than 20 percent of the original ticket price or $3.00, whichever was greater.  As ticket 
brokers, the New Jersey Association and Birn-Mar were allowed under municipal law to 
resell tickets to events at a price over face value.  The major component of their business in 
New Jersey was the resale of tickets for concerts at the Meadowlands and tickets for New 
York Giants football games (New Jersey Association v. Ticketron, 1988). 
However, New Jersey state law still prohibited the resale of tickets for more than 20 
percent of face value or $3.00, whichever was greater.  In order to purchase tickets to resell, 
both the New Jersey Association and Birn-Mar had to purchase tickets through Ticketron, the 
exclusive ticket agent for ticket sales for events at the Meadowlands and Giants Stadium.  
The New Jersey Association of Ticket Brokers and Birn-Mar argued the restrictions imposed 
on the resale of tickets forced them out of business, thus violating their due process rights 
accorded by the 14
th
 Amendment (New Jersey Association v. Ticketron, 1988). 
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Citing both Nebbia v. New York and Gold v. DiCarlo, the court found the law was 
reasonably related to a legislative purpose and promoted public welfare without 
discrimination.  Concerning the brokers‘ claim the law was discriminatory because it did not 
permit them a fair rate of return, the court found a lack of evidence that it was an 
unreasonable law because the brokers provided no facts to show the ticket brokerage 
business could not function within the written law (New Jersey Association v. Ticketron, 
1988).   
NPS, LLC et al v. StubHub, Inc. et al (2007) 
 The evolution of the online secondary ticket market posed many legal issues and 
concerns.  One NFL team, the New England Patriots, chose to fight back against season 
ticket holders reselling tickets online in an effort to protect their product.  NPS, LLC and the 
New England Patriots, L.P. (the Patriots) alleged a collection of their season ticket holders 
engaged in the unlicensed resale of tickets to Patriots‘ home football games.  These ticket 
sales were facilitated by the online secondary website, StubHub.  The Patriots claimed this 
was in violation of Patriots‘ ticket policies and sought to force StubHub to produce 
documents identifying season ticket holders who either offered or resold their tickets.  The 
Patriots intended to use that customer information to revoke season ticket rights or to report 
the violators to state authorities for violating Massachusetts anti-scalping legislation.  
Naturally, StubHub refused to turn over customer information (NPS v. StubHub, 2007). 
 The court, relying on Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency (2007), allowed the 
Patriots to acquire documents from StubHub of season ticket holders engaging in the online 
secondary ticket marketplace.  In Herman v. Admit One Ticket Agency (2007), the court had 
34 
 
ordered Admit One to produce the identity of Red Sox ticket holders who resold tickets 
through Admit One.  Admit One agreed to turn over documentation, but sought a protective 
order to prevent the use of that information outside the litigation.  The court allowed Admit 
One to enter a protective order that required the plaintiff to keep Admit One‘s ticket sources 
confidential and discovery was limited to the plaintiff‘s litigation needs in that case.  In NPS 
v. StubHub (2007), the court found the difference between Admit One and the NPS case was 
significance.  In Admit One, the plaintiff was a potential Red Sox ticket purchaser who said 
he was quoted ―grossly excessive prices,‖ which was in violation of Massachusetts state law.  
The plaintiff wanted Admit One‘s sources so that he could report them to authorities (NPS v. 
StubHub, 2007). 
 The court concluded the Patriots were in a different position than the plaintiff in 
Admit One.  In NPS v. StubHub, the Patriots claimed the use of their tickets permits 
customers to enter Gillette Stadium-which is private property-and watch the Patriots play 
football.  The Patriots argued they had a right to regulate that activity, which is unlike the 
interest of the plaintiff in Admit One.  The Patriots further claimed that tickets to their games, 
resold through StubHub, were originally purchased from the Patriots.  In Admit One, the 
plaintiff‘s concern surrounded his interest as a potential buyer.  The Patriots‘ concern 
surrounded obtaining information on their own customers that violated the Patriots‘ ticket 
resale regulations.  Thus, the court found the Patriots were in a different position and had 
legitimate needs that the plaintiff in Admit One did not have.  In addition, StubHub was not 
able show sufficient reasoning as far as why discovery could not be allowed.  The court 
found in favor of the Patriots (NPS v. StubHub, 2007).  
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Recent Legal Trends and the Effect of the Internet 
Again, as of 2007, 42 states have repealed anti-scalping legislation (Jacoby, 2007).  
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Arkansas are a few of the only states that still have anti-
scalping legislation (Collura, 2007).  Currently, lawmakers in Massachusetts are calling for 
the repeal of the state‘s anti-scalping legislation, or, at the very least, easing pricing 
restrictions.  New York State, which had one of the strictest anti-scalping legislation and 
enforcement, repealed its law in 2007.  The law does still ban scalpers from operating within 
1,500 feet of the venue, and requires a license for anyone selling more than five tickets to an 
event, but the legislation eliminated all pricing restrictions (Mohl, 2007).   
One reason for this trend is, as stated before, laws do not work.  With the growth of 
the internet, ticket scalping is easier and more efficient.  Online, scalping can be done in the 
comfort of one‘s home, and there is less risk of being caught because of enforcement 
difficulties (Benitah, 2005).  Though sites like StubHub encourage users to comply with state 
law, it still provides a venue for users to break the law, and the company still profits from the 
percentage fees it charges (Short, 2005). 
Another reason for the trend toward deregulation is that event promoters and 
lobbyists have pushed for the elimination of anti-scalping legislation.  Many companies 
engaged in the resale of tickets actively lobby state legislatures to remove or limit ticket 
resale restrictions.  The prevalence and success of the online secondary ticket market has not 
escaped the eyes of event promoters, and many have entered contracts with online secondary 
ticket market companies (Dreyer & Schwartz, 2007). 
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The combination of the difficulty monitoring online resales and political pressure to 
repeal anti-scalping legislation forced teams, leagues and other promoters to gradually accept 
the online secondary ticket market as a legitimate way of doing business.  However, the legal 
cases did not go away.  In the past, legal cases were between fans and the state; more recent 
legal cases are between fans and teams (Dreyer & Schwartz, 2007). 
In Cavoto v. Chicago Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., Chicago Cubs fans filed a class-
action suit, claiming the Chicago-Tribune-owned Cubs resold their own tickets, which 
violated Illinois law (Siporin, 2004).  In 2002, Tribune created Wrigley Field Premium 
Ticket Services as its ticket broker.  Thus, Tribune owned both the Cubs and Premium, where 
Premium bought unused tickets from the Cubs and resold them to the general public over 
face value (Benitah, 2005).  At issue was whether Premium was an extension of the Cubs 
organization, or an entirely separate corporation (Siporin, 2004). 
Fans were upset because they were paying higher prices; ticket scalpers were upset 
because the Cubs were doing exactly what Illinois law prevented scalpers from doing; and 
the MLB was upset because they did not receive any revenues from Premium‘s ticket profits 
(Benitah, 2005).  The Tribune, however, argued the Cubs wanted to provide a service to the 
public, by making tickets accessible and protecting fans from ticket fraud.  The court ruled 
the Cubs did not defraud customers or break Illinois scalping legislation (Siporin, 2004). 
The court ruled Premium satisfied all requirements in the Ticket Scalping Act as a 
licensed broker.  The plaintiffs failed to prove the Cubs concealed that the team and Premium 
were not owned by the same organization; in all instances, Premium was forthcoming 
regarding their relationship with the Cubs.  The court also found there was no injustice 
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because there was no arrangement between the Cubs and Premium that involved sharing 
Premium‘s profits.  They were both separate businesses that undertook risks and benefits of 
owning tickets (Siporin, 2004). 
However, the court‘s ruling has differed when the suit involves a team suing fans who 
resell tickets.  In NPS, LLC et al. v. StubHub, Inc. et al (2007), the New England Patriots 
sought to make StubHub identify patrons who bought or resold tickets, or even offered to buy 
and resell tickets.  The Patriots claimed season ticket holders engaged in unlicensed resale of 
tickets, and the organization needed StubHub‘s information to cancel their season tickets 
because they were in violation of Massachusetts‘ anti-scalping law (NPS v. StubHub, 2007).  
StubHub claimed there was a relevant market for Patriots tickets, and the organization had no 
right to regulate online secondary ticket competitors (NPS. v. StubHub, 2007). 
The court ruled the team was entitled to StubHub‘s patron information database.  The 
court stated the Patriots organization had a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of fans 
who resold tickets because that information was directly related to further prosecution of the 
case.  The Patriots further had a right to regulate scalping activity since the use of tickets took 
place in Gillette Stadium, which is private property (NPS v. StubHub, 2007). 
Since the court‘s ruling, the Patriots created a team-sponsored site with Ticketmaster 
where season ticket holders can resell unused tickets at face value.  The Patriots receive no 
additional revenue from the exchange, emphasizing the site‘s purpose is for fans to recover 
the cost of tickets without violating the team‘s policy or Massachusetts state law (Dreyer & 
Schwartz, 2007). 
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The Growth of Secondary Ticket Sales Online 
In America alone, the online secondary ticket market is worth over $10 billion, 
according to Jeffrey Fluhr, co-founder and former CEO of StubHub.  The internet has created 
a larger and more efficient market.  StubHub alone, which was organized in 2000, has 
revenues of $200 million, and is expected to triple annually (―Free-market Fleecing,‖ 2006).  
The online secondary ticket market is doing to the ticket industry what it did to the music and 
movie industries by offering technology that shifts power back to the consumer.  The shift 
online is fueled by supply and demand, with the rise of competing online secondary ticket 
sites allowing consumers to dictate the market value of tickets.  Some in the ticket industry 
have embraced the change, while others have fought the changes, leading to both increased 
competition and lawsuits.  Either way, if consumer demand exists and technology provides 
the means to enable it, it is nearly impossible to reverse the trend (Diaz, 2007). 
Online sites like EBay and Craigslist have enabled online ticket buyers and resellers 
to do business for years.  However, new reseller sites argue those transactions are as prone to 
fraud as buying from a street ticket scalper.  StubHub, for instance, considers itself a ticket 
intermediary.  The site does not resell the ticket itself, but, rather, provides a safe, reliable 
site for ticket buyers and resellers to do business.  It promises to take risk and uncertainty out 
of each transaction by providing a ticket guarantee, which is something Craigslist and EBay 
historically have not provided (Diaz, 2007).  Coincidentally, EBay purchased StubHub in 
2007 for more than $300 million, giving them a strong foothold in the online secondary ticket 
marketplace (Nocera, 2008). 
Online Ticket Sites and the Relationship with Promoters 
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The majority of teams, organizations and event promoters have embraced online 
secondary ticket companies in the last few years.  In a ‗if you can‘t beat ‗em, join ‗em‘ 
approach, many recognize the increase in online secondary ticket sites have made anti-
scalping laws unenforceable.  In addition, online secondary ticket sites have exposed the 
futility of trying to prevent the growth of a market that is driven by the laws of supply and 
demand (Nocera, 2008). 
More importantly, fans are more accepting of the online secondary ticket market.  As 
more fans utilize the sites to resell unused tickets, teams and promoters become more 
accepting, as well.  Also, organizations find fans are more likely to buy season tickets if they 
know they will be able to recoup their losses by reselling unusable tickets (Nocera, 2008). 
Most scalping now occurs through online secondary ticket sites or through registered 
ticket brokers, which makes combating scalping on a widespread level impractical (Bell, 
2006).  The secondary ticket market underwent a radical change beginning in 1999, with the 
surge and success of ticket scalping through online sites.  Online secondary ticket companies 
with highly refined software packages approached major sports teams and event promoters 
with an offer to provide a venue to resell season tickets at designated web sites as endorsed 
by the team (Happel & Jennings, 2002).  These agreements benefit teams and organizations 
because they receive both sponsorship revenues, and they provide an avenue for fans to 
acquire tickets and fill the stands (Dreyer & Schwartz, 2007).   
Online secondary ticket contracts vary, depending on the online secondary ticket 
company, and the team or organization.  In a sponsorship agreement, the online secondary 
ticket company pays the team a flat fee in exchange for being the sole resale vendor.  For 
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instance, StubHub pays a sponsorship fee and receives exclusive access to the team website 
and logo.  In this scenario, the team can make a consistent profit, regardless of the demand 
for tickets.  Another type of online secondary ticket company contract is a percentage fee 
agreement.  In this agreement, the team receives a commission from the resale value of the 
tickets.  Teams that partner with StubHub under this contract agreement usually receive 10 
percent of the resale price (Dreyer & Schwartz, 2007). 
A third online secondary ticket company contract is team-organized ticket exchanges 
where season ticket holders can resell tickets on a team-authorized marketplace.  The team 
has its own online secondary ticket site, powered by an online company (Dreyer & Schwartz, 
2007).  For instance, the Cleveland Cavaliers offer fans the chance to resell or transfer tickets 
through the online company ―Flash Seats,‖ which is offered on their official team website.  
This agreement allows the team to create its own limits as to which fans can resell and buy 
tickets, as well as offer a safe online marketplace branded by the team (―Flash Seats,‖ n.d.). 
One of the first organizations to endorse an official online secondary ticket company 
was the San Francisco Giants in 2000.  The program was named San Francisco Giants 
Double Play Ticket Window, and let season ticket holders resell individual game tickets they 
could not use (Happel & Jennings, 2002).  Another MLB team, the Seattle Mariners, sought 
to capture online secondary market ticket profits.  On their official website was an option 
called ―Ticket Marketplace,‖ where, again, season ticket holders could resell unused 
individual game tickets.  By charging 10 percent commission for ticket buyers and 15 percent 
for ticket resellers, the Mariners were able to earn over $100,000 in 2003 (Bell, 2006).   
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In 2007, the MLB announced a five-year agreement with StubHub (Jacoby, 2007).  
On each team‘s site, they offer a StubHub ticket exchange option that allows fans to freely 
resell unused tickets at any price (―San Francisco Giants,‖ 2008).  In exchange, the MLB 
collects a share of StubHub‘s revenue, and StubHub receives 15 percent revenue upon 
completion of the ticket sale (―San Francisco Giants,‖ 2008).  Likewise, in 2007, the National 
Football League (NFL) named Ticketmaster as its official ticket reseller.  In exchange, 
Ticketmaster pays the NFL $20 million annually for the endorsement (Nocera, 2008). 
College Athletics and Ticket Scalping 
In 2006, Penn State made a deal with Ticketmaster to take advantage of the online 
secondary ticket market, making it the first NCAA school to make such a deal.  The deal 
with Ticket Exchange, powered by Ticketmaster, creates an opportunity to get tickets into 
fans‘ hands in a way that is legal, efficient and profitable for the Nittany Lions.  In the 2006 
deal, Penn State received a cut of the 15 percent convenience fee on every ticket resale 
(Biertempfel, 2006). 
Among many college athletic administrators, the rationale to team with ticket 
companies is simple.  Since many season ticket holders are already reselling tickets through 
online secondary ticket companies, college athletic departments might as well get on board, 
and officially receive a cut of the profit through contract agreements.  In addition, such 
arrangements can be win-win situations for both the athletic departments and their fans.  
Making unused tickets available helps retain customers, and increases satisfaction of 
customer bases (Biertempfel, 2006). 
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StubHub moves about 300,000 tickets a month, and the company was rated by Inc. 
Magazine as the eighth-fastest growing private firm in the U.S.  This profit potential has 
prompted college athletic departments to cash in by teaming with online secondary ticket 
companies (Biertempfel, 2006).  This figure is a small drop in the bucket, considering some 
estimates put the annual revenue potential from online secondary tickets at $2 billion, but to 
many college athletic departments looking for new revenue streams deals with online 
secondary ticket companies can be beneficial (Biertempfel, 2006).  Currently, StubHub is an 
official ticket sponsor with 14 universities, including, University of Southern California, 
West Virginia, Texas A & M, Stanford and California (―NCAA Basketball Tickets,‖ 2008).  
These schools have deals to send football ticket holders and buyers to StubHub, as well as 
provide a platform on their athletic department sites where fans can access the online 
secondary ticket marketplace (Johnson, 2007).  There was a time when the markets and 
teams preferred to split the revenue from online secondary ticket sales.  Now, however, most 
deals are sponsorship agreements.  Specific financial details are not available on such 
partnerships, but in exchange for paying a sponsorship fee in a five-year contract, schools 
provide advertising space inside stadiums and on the athletic department‘s websites.  In this 
fixed-fee model, athletic departments can predict their revenue, instead of being susceptible 
to sub-par performing teams that may negatively affect profit percentages (Biertempfel, 
2006) 
In addition, in many sponsorship deals, the exchange of information can be just as 
valuable as money.  Athletic departments are always trying to obtain demographic data about 
online ticket buyers in an effort to better cater to their fans.  The online secondary ticket 
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companies are just as eager for information and exposure to a team‘s season ticket holders, 
who are potential customers (Biertempfel, 2006). 
NCAA Deal with RazorGator 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, the NCAA recently partnered with RazorGator, a Los 
Angeles-based online ticket reseller, to allow fans to buy and resell tickets to the NCAA 
Men‘s Basketball Final Four (Lemke, 2007).  This partnership makes RazorGator the Official 
Ticket and Hospitality Package Provider for the NCAA Final Four.  As advertised on the 
RazorGator website, the online secondary ticket company is able to secure the best tickets, in 
addition to exclusive access to pregame festivities.  Fans can choose to purchase from all-
session, semi-finals or championship game tickets, and, for the 2008 NCAA Final Four had a 
selection of seats ranging in price from $4,500 each for prime locations to $410 for seats in 
the upper level behind the basket (RazorGator, 2008).  RazorGator then lets fans negotiate 
the resale of tickets via the PrimeSport fan-to-fan ticket exchange if they are unable to use 
their tickets or if their team is eliminated (―PrimeSport Inks Extension,‖ 2009).     
Though the NCAA still holds a public sale, which is distributed through a lottery, it 
also sells blocks of tickets at face value to RazorGator to offer for resale.  Just prior to the 
2008 NCAA Final Four in San Antonio, RazorGator sold all-session ticket packages for 
almost 15 times the face value of $140-$220.  Of these packages, 14 blocks of tickets were 
available for resale in the lower level of the Alamodome.  The tickets sold to RazorGator 
come from tickets reserved for public sale and the NCAA‘s use, 22 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively.  Tickets are also allocated to participating schools (35%), the local host 
committee (10%), the National Basketball Coaches‘ Association (8%), college athletic 
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directors (8%), and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and corporate sponsors (6%) 
(McCarthy, 2008). 
The exact amount the NCAA makes off the deal is undisclosed.  However, Jeff Lapin, 
CEO of RazorGator states the two parties split the online revenue (McCarthy, 2008).  
RazorGator does charge a 25 percent fee on each ticket resold on the website (Johnson, 
2007).    According to Johnson (2007), if a fan spends $1,819 for the highest-priced ticket for 
the 2007 Final Four, the NCAA and RazorGator will share as much as $454.  The NCAA 
also shares in profits made through RazorGator‘s hotel packages (Johnson, 2007). 
The NCAA had another partnership with Firstdibz.com, in which it received a share 
of the fees charged by the online secondary ticket company (Johnson, 2008).  Fans could 
purchase options for the opportunity to buy Final Four tickets on Firstdibz.  This gave the fan 
the obligation and right to pay face value for tickets if the fan‘s team made it to the Final 
Four.  Up until the fan‘s team was eliminated or the market was closed, the fan could resell 
the option to buy on the Firstdibz marketplace at a profit (―NCAA Men‘s Final Four,‖ 2008).  
A team was eliminated if it did not make the tournament or lost during the tournament, and 
the online secondary ticket market was closed once Regional games completed and the Final 
Four field was set (Horton, 2006).  The fan could also hold on to the option, but, if the fan‘s 
team did not get to the Final Four or decided not to attend after the market closed, he or she 
could not recoup their costs (―NCAA Men‘s Final Four,‖ 2008).  After receiving negative 
publicity for the Firstdibz contract because the online trading aspect was perceived as 
gambling, the NCAA cut ties as an official partner (―NCAA Dissociates,‖ 2009).   
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While maintaining a firm stance against unregulated scalping, the NCAA seeks to 
capitalize on the success of the online secondary ticket market (Johnson, 2008).  Through 
RazorGator, large blocks of prime Final Four tickets are resold at markups of hundreds or 
thousands of dollars (McCarthy, 2008).  From the NCAA perspective, this push into the 
online secondary ticket market makes financial sense for student-athletes and fans (Johnson, 
2008).  However, the deal between an online secondary ticket company and the NCAA also 
blurs the line between primary ticket issuers and ticket scalpers (Johnson, 2007). 
Financial Incentive for the NCAA 
One of the tasks assigned to the NCAA‘s Greg Shaheen, senior vice president for 
basketball and business strategies, is to broaden the NCAA‘s revenue sources to support the 
needs of college athletics (―The 10 Most Powerful People in College Sports,‖ 2007).  The 
NCAA entered the RazorGator agreement in an effort to maintain the integrity of the 
championship and capture profits from the online secondary ticket market to increase 
revenue for NCAA member institutions (―NCAA Selects RazorGator‖, 2006).  The NCAA, 
which has not disclosed the value of the RazorGator deal, operates with a budget of around 
$614 million. Ninety percent of the NCAA‘s revenue is generated from television and ticket 
sales from the men‘s basketball tournament (Brown, 2008).  In 2008, according to the 
NCAA, the men‘s tournament generated $503 in television revenue and $47 million in ticket 
sales (McCarthy, 2008). Almost all of that money is distributed to member institutions 
(Johnson, 2008).   
According to Johnson (2008), RazorGator most likely paid for the marketing rights 
for the NCAA Final Four trademark, and shares a percentage of what the company earns 
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from service fees.  Fees charged through the online ticket site can add up to 22 percent to the 
price of the re-sold ticket.  If a ticket package costs $2,650, then RazorGator and the NCAA 
receives $583 in fees.  Again, the exact percentage that each receives is undisclosed 
(Johnson, 2008). 
Service to Fans 
Not only does the NCAA want to capture profits from the online secondary ticket 
market, they also want to exert control over ticket scalping, in order to protect fans against 
ticket fraud (Johnson, 2007).  According to Shaheen, over a five-year period, an NCAA study 
showed fans who had the opportunity to purchase tickets were often reselling them on the 
online secondary ticket market.  Therefore, a concern facing the NCAA was illegitimate 
ticket arrangements through these unauthorized scalpers (Brown, 2008).  Many fans prefer 
ticket sales sanctioned by a team or organization through online ticket companies because it 
reduces-or eliminates-ticket fraud (Johnson, 2007).  When fans purchase tickets from 
scalpers-either through unauthorized websites or on the street outside the venue-they run the 
risk of purchasing illegitimate tickets.  However, as the authorized online ticket marketplace 
for the NCAA Tournament, RazorGator guarantees tickets purchased through their site are 
authentic and will provide tickets that are comparable or better if a deal falls through 
(Johnson, 2008).   
Fans also ran the risk of ticket fraud when fans whose team lost in the semifinals 
resold championship tickets.  Again, as the transaction did not occur through an authorized 
website, there was the chance the ticket could be invalid.  RazorGator will actually negotiate 
with fans who want to resell championship tickets if their team loses in the semi-finals 
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through their Fan2Fan Exchange.  Again, this provides a way for fans to get tickets and help 
provide consumer protections through an authorized online ticket marketplace (―NCAA 
Selects RazorGator,‖ 2006). 
Blurred Line 
According to Gary Shaheen, NCAA senior vice president for basketball and business 
strategies, the NCAA recognizes the fact that the resale of tickets has existed in the past with 
no proceeds going to NCAA programs.  From the NCAA‘s view, they are attempting to 
provide a legitimate means for people who are willing to make an investment to get tickets, 
and, at the same time, boosting revenue for NCAA-sponsored programs (Garcia, 2006).  But 
ethical and legal questions surround the online secondary ticket market‘s prevalence and 
acceptance with college athletic departments and the NCAA governing body. 
According to Russ Haven of the New York Public Interest Group, while eliminating 
unauthorized ticket brokers is a legitimate idea, the NCAA and RazorGator are essentially 
trying to replace unsanctioned online brokers with their own sanctioned operation 
(McCarthy, 2008).  The NCAA has maintained a firm stance against unregulated scalping, 
but has entered a contract in order to share in the wealth of the online secondary ticket 
market.  Marked-up prices on tickets and an up to 25 percent transaction fee means many 
average fans cannot compete (Johnson, 2008).  This sends mixed messages about the ideals 
college sports should endorse (McCarthy, 2008).  It leads to concern among observers that 
the nonprofit governing body of college sports has essentially gone professional.  Though the 
NCAA adheres strongly to the amateur ideal, its deal with an online ticket broker lends to the 
perception that it is operating similar to a professional sports enterprise (Johnson, 2008). 
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In addition, member school officials were never briefed regarding the NCAA‘s 
relationship with RazorGator.  The total ticket allotment, as well as the number of tickets in 
the lower level, provided to each participating school was reduced by the NCAA since the 
deal with RazorGator.  In 2003, participating schools received 4,500 tickets to sell for the 
Final Four, with at least half in the lower level of the arena.  For the 2008 Final Four in San 
Antonio, participating schools only received 3,750 tickets, most of which were in the upper 
level (Brown, 2008). 
Economic Reasons Why the Secondary Ticket Market Exists 
To many economists, scalping is a benign activity that creates value.  Consumers who 
will voluntarily buy and sell tickets do so because they will benefit from the transactions 
(Krueger, 2001).  Ticket scalpers offer a useful service to a number of consumers (Criscuolo, 
1995).  In a ticket economy, demand almost always exceeds supply (Benitah, 2005).  
Therefore, scalpers resell tickets to those fans that do not have them and are willing to pay 
the market clearing price of a ticket.  Scalpers help ensure that fans who want to attend an 
event have the opportunity to do so (Criscuolo, 1995).  More importantly, in a free market 
economy, people can buy and sell at whatever price they choose (Benitah, 2005). 
Reason One: Promoters Set Low Ticket Prices 
According to Swofford (1999), there are three reasons for the existence of the 
secondary ticket market.  The first reason is because ticket firms purposely set ticket prices 
low.  Promoters set low prices to deal with market uncertainty and to avoid risk.  It is 
uncertain from season to season exactly what demand will be for a ticket to an event.  
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Without prior knowledge of fans‘ demand for tickets, promoters have no choice but to set the 
ticket price low to appeal to a wide audience that can afford the ticket.  Therefore, ticket 
firms trade profits for certainty that they can maximize revenues by selling out the event 
(Swofford, 1999). 
In ticket sales, there are two different types of consumers: those who buy in advance 
to ensure they get a ticket, and others who wait to purchase because they may not know if 
they can attend until the last minute (Courty, 2003).   
This difference in consumer behavior explains the conflict between promoters and the 
secondary ticket market.  It is essential that promoters have tickets available early to satisfy 
consumers who plan in advance to attend an event.  This leaves a profit opportunity for 
brokers and scalpers, however.  They can buy tickets early and then resell them later to 
consumers who decide to attend the event late, and are willing to pay higher prices (Courty, 
2003).  Whereas, if a ticket firm sets a high ticket price from the beginning, they may price a 
number of customers out of the market, running the risk of having unused tickets (Swofford, 
1999).  In this scenario, promoters cannot capture profits earned by brokers and scalpers, nor 
prevent them from entering the market (Courty, 2003). 
In view of predictable excess demand for a popular sport, for example professional 
football, it is natural to wonder why the National Football League does not charge more for 
tickets in the primary market.  According to Greg Aiello, NFL vice president for public 
relations, the organization does not charge more for two reasons.  One, the league tries to set 
a ―fair and reasonable price‖ in order to maintain an ―ongoing relationship with fans and 
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business associates‖ (Krueger, p. 25).  Second, the NFL chooses to take a long-term strategic 
view by charging a fair price, thus promoting consumer goodwill (Krueger, 2001). 
In the professional football setting, there are few games during the course of the 
season, and each game has a great impact on team‘s post-season futures.  In a study by 
Krueger (2001), tickets for Super Bowl XXXV had a face value of $325 to $400, depending 
on the seat at Raymond James Stadium in Tampa, Florida.  The NFL offers a general public 
lottery for the chance to buy 1,000 tickets.  For Super Bowl XXXV, they received 36,000 
applicants.  The face-value of the ticket is obviously well below the price that would balance 
excess demand.  According to Krueger (2001), tickets scalped outside the stadium were 
priced between $1,500 and $3,500.  If the NFL chose an average market-clearing ticket price 
of $2,300, the organization could increase its revenue by about $150 million.  In comparison, 
advertising revenue for the Super Bowl typically generated $200 million during that year 
(Krueger, 2001).  However, when Krueger (2001) surveyed the 1,000 football fans who won 
the right to buy a pair of tickets at face-value ($325 to $400), if they would have been willing 
to pay $3,000 a ticket, 94 percent said they would not have been willing to do so.  In 
addition, in Krueger‘s survey of those attending Super Bowl XXXV, 92 percent thought it 
would not be fair for the NFL to set the face-value of a ticket to $1,500, even if some tickets 
were resold for that amount.  Even among fans that actually paid more than $1,500 for their 
Super Bowl ticket, 83 percent thought it would be unfair for the NFL to charge $1,500 per 
ticket (Krueger, 2001). 
Reason Two: Scalpers Have Lower Cost Functions 
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The second reason the secondary market exists is because scalpers have lower cost 
functions.  Scalpers can get information about the consumer market and can get the product 
to the consumer at a lower cost than the original producer.  For instance, a scalper needs only 
to either stand on a street corner or go online to bring the product to the consumer.  In this 
informal setting, the scalper can also determine the market demand by simply talking with 
consumers.  In contrast, a ticket firm has a higher cost of conducting business.  The producer 
spends money on ticketing software, printing costs and employees.  This cost is in addition to 
time spent determining who their consumers are, and creating and implementing marketing 
plans to reach those consumers (Swofford, 1999).   
Reason Three: Different Time Frames 
The secondary market also exists because ticket promoters and ticket scalpers are 
concerned with profit and revenue over different time frames.  If a promoter‘s sales in the 
future depend on its reputation with consumers, then prices need to be lower in order to 
satisfy consumers.  Satisfied consumers lead to greater sales in the future.  The ticket firm is 
more concerned with a positive reputation in the long-term (Swofford, 1999). 
A scalper, however, does not expect to regularly resell tickets to particular consumers 
and has no incentive to create consumer goodwill over a long period of time.  The original 
promoter, in this case, is not able to capture the profit earned by the scalper.  Any increase in 
short-term profits might be lost in future profits associated with the loss of a positive 
reputation.  The scalper is only concerned with maximizing profits over a short period of 
time (Swofford, 1999).   
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For instance, in a comparison between busy professionals and extremely loyal fans, 
the loyal fans are more likely to buy advance tickets through the promoter.  This ensures they 
have a ticket to support their team.  Busy professionals, however, may not be able to plan in 
advance to secure tickets through the promoter.  But they may be willing to pay more for the 
ticket from a scalper, if they can attend at the last minute.  If the number of loyal fans is 
greater than the number of busy professionals, it is in the promoter‘s best interest to set 
below-market ticket prices to please loyal fans and maximize profits.  For scalpers 
unconcerned about long-term relationships with consumers, however, this profit 
maximization by the promoter provides a profit opportunity (Courty, 2003). 
Economic Arguments For and Against Anti-Scalping Legislation 
Anti-scalping legislation has fueled debate from an economic standpoint.  Elfenbein 
(2006) argues restricting the secondary market leads to inefficient distribution of tickets, and 
reduces social welfare if those willing to pay higher prices are not able to acquire tickets.  
Swofford (1999) argues promoters and law enforcement officers cannot stop ticket scalping.  
First, the cost involved with enforcing the legislation is too high and too time-consuming.  
Second, in the long run, it is not profitable for promoters to increase the cost of tickets in an 
attempt to discourage scalpers from purchasing tickets in the primary market.  If ticket 
promoters set the price too high, they run the risk of losing consumer goodwill and losing 
profits among their most loyal fans (Swofford, 1999). 
Courty (2003) offers arguments both for and against anti-scalping legislation.  On one 
hand, anti-scalping legislation prevents ticket scalpers from taking advantage of high demand 
and making unfair profits.  By charging high prices that many fans are unable to afford, 
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events are inaccessible to the general public.  Under this argument, ticket scalping should be 
banned in order to increase public welfare through the elimination of price gouging.  If ticket 
resale is prohibited, scalpers‘ profits are kept by the promoters or the consumers, depending 
on the price promoters set on tickets (Courty, 2003).   
On the other hand, ticket scalpers provide a service by making tickets available in the 
late market, creating value in three ways.  First, they seek new consumers that might not 
attend the event otherwise, if the consumer does not have tickets.  Second, ticket scalpers aid 
in market-clearing by helping fill seats that might otherwise go unused.  Furthermore, 
scalpers help give value to the event by buying tickets early, thus endorsing the event, 
increasing demand and helping ensure a sell-out.  Third, scalpers help promoters by putting 
tickets in the hands of those consumers whom promoters might not reach.  For instance, if a 
consumer is unwilling to wait in line at the box office to buy tickets, he or she may find it 
more convenient to purchase tickets from a scalper, especially if they have better seats 
(Courty, 2003). 
Empirical Research on Ticket Scalping 
Does Anti-Scalping Legislation Increase Ticket Cost? 
Throughout the 20
th
 century, 22 states passed laws prohibiting or regulating ticket 
scalping, due to public scrutiny.  As discussed earlier, anti-scalping laws continue to be a 
source of great controversy.  Despite the political and theoretical focus on anti-scalping 
legislation, empirical work illustrating how anti-scalping laws affect the marketplace is 
limited (Elfenbein, 2006). 
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Theoretical models suggest scalpers cause an increase in ticket prices because the 
scalpers represent an increase in demand.  If anti-scalping laws are effective, then they 
reduce demand for tickets and reduce ticket prices (Depken, 2005).  However, these are 
solely theoretical models.  Depken (2005) provides empirical evidence showing how anti-
scalping legislation correlates with an increase in ticket price. 
Scalpers value tickets only as much as they are profitable in the secondary market.  
They place little value on a ticket if it is not resold for a profit.  In a market where scalping is 
legal, event promoters face two types of high-demand consumers in the primary market: fans 
who buy tickets early, do not resell their tickets and desire to attend the event; and scalpers, 
who do not want to attend the event and desire to resell tickets for a profit (Depken, 2005). 
Depken‘s theory states anti-scalping legislation might actually cause an increase in 
ticket price in the primary market, which is counter to the legislative purpose.  If scalpers are 
not in the market, Depken predicts it is possible event promoters will increase the price 
because the only people purchasing tickets are fans that actually plan on attending the event.  
As attending the game is important to these fans, they may be willing to pay more for the 
ticket (Depken, 2005).   
Depken‘s empirical evidence examined two professional sports, football and baseball.  
He examined average per-game season ticket data in multiple cities with varying scalping 
legislation, from 1991-2003.  He found that in the cities with anti-scalping legislation, such 
laws correlate with higher ticket prices in football and baseball in the primary market.  MLB 
teams charged 14.1 percent more, while NFL teams charged 23.6 percent more for season 
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tickets, per-game.  However, Depken (2005) found it more difficult to measure whether anti-
scalping legislation improves the social welfare of the athletic ticket market. 
The Relationship Between Anti-Scalping Laws and Online Ticket Scalping 
Elfenbein (2006) found anti-scalping laws affects online trade where it concerns the 
amount of tickets offered for resale.  Using a sample of 400,000 transactions processed by 
EBay, Elfenbein‘s (2006) study explores the effects of anti-scalping legislation on the 
amount of NFL tickets resold between 2002 and 2005. 
Market regulation and enforcement can be targeted at either those buying tickets, or 
those reselling tickets.  If regulations are aimed at resellers, such as licensing fees and 
penalties for broken rules, these regulations decrease the ticket quantity supplied, thus 
increasing the ticket price in the secondary market.  Legislation aimed at buyers, such as 
fines for purchasing, reduces demand and reduces scalpers‘ market-clearing prices 
(Elfenbein, 2006). 
Therefore, Elfenbein (2006) predicted that stronger market regulation and 
enforcement reduces the quantity of tickets supplied for resale and that ticket resale prices 
depend on whether the law targets sellers or buyers. 
Elfenbein (2006) found NFL tickets resold for an average of 83% over face value.  In 
addition, 927 tickets per NFL game were sold on EBay on average, accounting for roughly 
1.4% of game day attendance.  These figures represent just tickets resold on EBay, and not 
through other secondary ticket websites, or outside the arena (Elfenbein, 2006).  Elfenbein 
(2006) estimates EBay sales represent one fourth of all NFL tickets resold online. 
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Elfenbein (2006) categorized regulation of resale by states in four different manners: 
License states: home teams in states with legislation requiring a license to resell 
tickets 
Free market states: home teams in states with no anti-scalping legislation 
Not-above-face-value states: home teams in states prohibiting sales above face value 
Not-at-site states: home teams in states prohibiting ticket resale at the event site 
In a comparison between license states and free market states, on average, 225 fewer 
tickets per game were resold on EBay in license states.  When comparing free market states 
to not-above-face-value states, there was an average of 500 fewer tickets resold on EBay in 
not-above-face-value states.  Therefore, Elfenbein (2006) found state regulations are related 
to the number of transactions that occur. 
However, the numbers of transactions are only affected as long as the law is enforced.  
Buyers and sellers learn over time that, if they do not run the risk of being caught, they can 
buy and resell fairly freely, regardless of the state‘s law.  In the long-run, Elfenbein (2006) 
found impact of state law dissipated.  For example, the percentage of total tickets sold in not-
above-face-value states compared to all other states rose from 47% in 2002 to 67% in 2004.  
Resellers grew to learn that regulations were not enforced (Elfenbein, 2006). 
Elfenbein (2006) also examined anti-scalping regulation and the geography of tickets 
resold online.  Completed transactions for tickets to games in license states are about 10% 
(p<0.05) more likely to involve sellers not from the home team‘s state, when compared to 
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free market states, and 17.5% (p<0.01) more likely when compared to not-at-site states.   
Tickets for games in not-above-face-value states are 24 % (p<0.001) and 31% (p<0.001) 
more likely to be resold by out-of-state sellers than in free market and not-at-site states, 
respectively.  These regressions show the supply of secondary tickets from ticket holders in 
home team states are lower the stronger the anti-scalping laws (Elfenbein, 2006). 
Elfenbein‘s data demonstrates that, in states with resale regulations, the level of 
online trade is lower.  In looking to the long-term effect of ticket scalping regulations, 
Elfenbein concludes that legislation is disregarded.  In states that prohibit resale above face-
value, the fraction of potential resellers deterred by anti-scalping legislation is falls.  Over 
time, these states increasingly resemble states with no ticket scalping regulation (Elfenbein, 
2006).   
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 This chapter details the methodology used in this study, including the subjects of the 
study, and the instrument and procedures utilized.  This chapter also details the means of 
obtaining data and the examination of that data. 
Subjects 
 The subjects in this study were the highest ranking ticket office official at NCAA 
Football Bowl Subdivision athletic departments in the United States.  Each institution was 
selected by using information through athletic conference websites, which had direct links to 
athletic department websites within the conference.  The researcher examined all the titles of 
ticket office staff, and selected the email address of the highest ranking ticket office official.   
Research Instrument and Procedure 
 The instrument used in this study was an electronic online survey. The survey was 
developed by forming a couple survey questions that would help answer each research 
question, and yield quantitative results.  The researcher‘s advisor and thesis committee 
assisted greatly in the matter of polishing the survey so that the questions on it thoroughly 
answered the research questions. 
 A test study was conducted prior to the survey to test its legitimacy.  The survey was 
sent to one associate athletic director, one ticket office manager, and three assistant ticket 
office managers.  The survey was also sent to a graduate intern in the athletic fundraising 
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office, and an employee in the athletic business office.  All test subjects work for the athletic 
department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
The survey was distributed through electronic mail to the highest ranking ticket office 
officials at Football Bowl Subdivision athletic departments.  The email included a survey 
link, and a cover letter explaining the purpose and importance of the study.  After 10 days, a 
follow-up email was distributed to all ticket office officials, whether they had responded or 
not.  At the completion of two weeks since the first email, the survey was closed and the 
results compiled. 
Data Analysis 
 Research questions were divided into those that warranted descriptive statistics or a 
chi-square analysis.  For descriptive statistics, the researcher looked the frequency of 
responses for the research questions regarding the relationship between ticket offices and 
online secondary ticket companies, the reasons why or why not a contract exists, and the 
opinions of ticket office officials.  
 The chi-square analysis sought to determine a relationship between the ticket office‘s 
status with the online secondary ticket market and opinions of ticket office officials.  It also 
sought to determine a relationship between the status with the online secondary ticket market 
and the number of football and men‘s basketball games sold out.  During the chi-square 
analysis, percentages were also run in an effort to obtain descriptive statistics, if no 
relationship was found. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Results 
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between the online 
secondary ticket market and Football Bowl Subdivision athletic departments.  The following 
chapter will analyze data from respondents.  A total of 122 athletic department officials were 
asked to participate in the survey, which accounts for all of the athletic departments 
categorized as Football Bowl Subdivision.  There are a variety of titles and positions with a 
collegiate athletic ticket office, and each school‘s hierarchy is different.  For this reason, the 
highest ranking ticket office official from each institution was asked to complete the survey.  
A total of 41 completed the survey, for a response rate of 34%. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Respondents 
The survey was sent to the highest ranking ticket office official at each school, and 
because schools use a variety of titles, each respondent was asked to provide his or her 
official job title.  The majority (55%) of respondents were either an associate athletic director 
for tickets, or an assistant athletic director for tickets.  The titles assistant athletic director for 
ticket services, assistant athletic director for ticket operations and assistant athletic director 
for ticket sales were collapsed, as all titles are similar.  One participant did not respond to the 
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question, therefore, a total of 40 provided their official job titles (n=40). Table 1 shows the 
job titles of respondents, as well as the frequency of each.   
Table 1 
Job Titles 
Title Percentage Frequency 
Ticket Manager 15% 6 
Assistant Athletic Director 
for Ticket Operations 
40% 16 
Associate Athletic Director 
for Ticket Operations 
15% 6 
Director of Ticket Operations 22.5% 9 
Assistant Athletic Director 
for Corporate Sales & Ticket 
Operations 
2.5% 1 
Associate Athletic Director 
for Tickets & Marketing 
2.5% 1 
Associate Ticket Manager 2.5% 1 
 
Research Question 1 
Q1 - What is the relationship between NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision ticket 
offices and the online secondary ticket market? 
Ticket office officials were asked to choose one of four statements that best described 
their ticket office‘s relationship with the online secondary ticket market.  It was determined 
by the researcher that the most concrete form of a relationship would be of a written contract 
between an online secondary ticket company and the athletic ticket office.  The next level of 
relationship was if the ticket office did not have a formal contract with an online secondary 
62 
 
ticket company, but recommended a specific online secondary ticket company.  A lack of 
relationship would be exhibited by ticket offices that did not have a contract nor 
recommended a specific online secondary ticket company. The majority of respondents fell 
into this category; 67.5% did not have formal contracts nor recommended a specific online 
secondary ticket company.  The final category indicating a lack of relationship reflected the 
possibility that schools would not have a relationship with a secondary ticket reseller because 
state laws prohibited it.  One participant skipped this survey question (n=40).  Table 2 
provides the frequency and percentage of responses for each of the possible relationships. 
Table 2 
Relationship Between NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision Ticket Offices and the Online 
Secondary Ticket Market 
Relationship Percentage Frequency 
Formal contract for resale 
with a specific online 
secondary ticket company 
30% 12 
No formal contract, but 
recommends a specific 
online secondary ticket 
company 
2.5% 1 
No formal contract and does 
not recommend a specific 
online secondary ticket 
company 
67.5% 27 
Do not allow ticket resale 
and prosecute ticket holders 
who try to resell tickets on 
the online secondary ticket 
market 
0% 0 
 
Research Question 2 
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Once the relationship was determined, the next question was: Why do college athletic 
ticket offices have or do not have contracts with online secondary ticket companies? 
Existence of a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company 
Thirty percent of the survey participants (n=12) indicated that they have a contact 
with an online secondary ticket company.  Those 12 respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of why their athletic department had the contract.  Half of the respondents placed 
a ―strong importance‖ on the added revenue that a formal contract provides the athletic 
department.  The majority (58.3%) placed a ―moderate importance‖ on the ability for 
customers to acquire tickets through an official online secondary ticket company, while 50% 
of the respondents placed a ―moderate importance‖ on an official online secondary ticket 
company as an efficient way for season ticket holders to sell unused tickets.   
Respondents were also given an opportunity to indicate other reasons for existence of 
a contract, as well as rate the reason.  One respondent gave ―absolute importance‖ to a formal 
contract with an online secondary ticket company as a way to ensure customers using the 
secondary market would receive valid tickets.  Another respondent did not rank the degree of 
importance, but stated: 
The athletic department and ticket office are in different departments with different 
opinions.  The ticket office believes we could run our own secondary ticket market, 
with a proper interface and make more money than currently supplied by a 
sponsorship with a secondary market company. 
 Table 3 provides the frequency and percentage of responses indicating the degree of 
importance for why respondents have a formal contract with an online secondary ticket 
company. 
64 
 
Table 3  
The Perceived Degree of Importance for Reasons for Having a Formal Contract with a 
Specific Online Secondary Ticket Company 
Degree of 
Importance 
Absolute 
Importance 
Strong 
Importance  
Moderate 
Importance  
Weak 
Importance  
No 
Importance  
The contract 
provides 
added revenue 
for the athletic 
department 
 
8.3% (n=1) 
 
50% (n=6) 
 
25% (n=3) 
 
8.3% (n=1) 
 
8.3% (n=1) 
It is an 
efficient way 
for customers 
to get tickets 
 
8.3% (n=1) 
 
16.7% 
(n=2) 
 
58.3% 
(n=7) 
 
16.7% 
(n=2) 
 
0% (n=0) 
It is an 
efficient way 
for season 
ticket holders 
to sell unused 
or unneeded 
tickets 
 
8.3% (n=1) 
 
33.3% 
(n=4) 
 
50% (n=6) 
 
8.3% (n=1) 
 
0% (n=0) 
The online 
secondary 
ticket 
company 
provides 
demographic 
data about 
online ticket 
buyers that 
helps our 
ticket office to 
better market 
direct sales to 
potential 
customers 
 
 
 
16.7% 
(n=2) 
 
 
 
16.7% 
(n=2) 
 
 
 
33.3% 
(n=4) 
 
 
 
16.7% 
(n=2) 
 
 
 
16.7% 
(n=2) 
 
No formal contract with an online secondary ticket company  
Twenty seven respondents indicated no formal contract with an online secondary 
ticket company, nor recommended a specific online company.  When asked to measure the 
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degree of importance for reasons why no such contract existed, the majority (59.2%) gave 
absolute to strong importance that their athletic department wanted to protect customers 
against ticket fraud from tickets sold through online secondary ticket sites.  However, the 
majority (51%) indicated weak to no importance when asked about the importance of 
protecting customers against the high prices charged through online secondary ticket sites.   
Sixty six percent indicated weak to no importance to ticket resale being illegal in their 
state, while 22.2% gave absolute to strong importance to that statement.   Opinions were 
fairly evenly distributed regarding reluctance from the University as a reason for not having a 
formal contract; 34.6% indicated absolute to strong importance, 34.6% indicated moderate to 
weak importance, and 30.8% indicated reluctance from the University was not at all 
important as a reason for not having a formal contract.  34.6% indicated moderate importance 
to a lack of demand as the rationale behind not having a formal contract.  Table 4 provides 
the frequency and percentage of responses for each of the reasons for not having a formal 
contract.   
Table 4 
The Perceived Degree of Importance for Reasons for Not Having a Formal Contract with a 
Specific Online Secondary Ticket Company 
Degree of 
Importance 
Absolute 
Importance  
Strong 
Importance  
Moderate 
Importance  
Weak 
Importance  
No 
Importance  
There is 
reluctance 
from our 
University 
and/or athletic 
department 
 
23.1% 
(n=6) 
 
11.5% 
(n=3) 
 
23.1% 
(n=6) 
 
11.5% 
(n=3) 
 
30.8% 
(n=8) 
It is against 
the law to 
resell tickets 
in my state 
 
14.8% 
(n=4) 
 
7.4% (n=2) 
 
11.1% 
(n=3) 
 
18.5% 
(n=5) 
 
48.1% 
(n=13) 
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We do not 
have the 
demand for a 
formal 
contract with 
a specific 
online 
secondary 
ticket 
company 
 
19.2% 
(n=5) 
 
15.4% 
(n=4) 
 
34.6% 
(n=9) 
 
11.5% 
(n=3) 
 
19.2% 
(n=5) 
We want to 
protect our 
customers 
against the 
high prices 
charged 
through online 
secondary 
ticket 
companies 
 
 
11.1% 
(n=3) 
 
 
22.2% 
(n=6) 
 
 
14.8% 
(n=4) 
 
 
29.6% 
(n=8) 
 
 
22.2% 
(n=6) 
We want to 
protect our 
customers 
against ticket 
fraud from 
tickets sold 
through online 
secondary 
ticket sites 
 
 
25.9% 
(n=7) 
 
 
33.3% 
(n=9) 
 
 
14.8% 
(n=4) 
 
 
14.8% 
(n=4) 
 
 
11.1% 
(n=3) 
 
Research Question 3 
Online secondary ticket companies such as StubHub or Ticket Exchange are not the 
only option for athletic departments that seek to redistribute unused tickets.  Do college 
athletic departments have a formal internal ticket return program run by the athletic ticket 
office and/or fundraising office?  
 All 41 survey participants answered this question.  The majority (56.1%, n=23) did 
not have a formal ticket return program run through the ticket office and/or fundraising 
office.  However, 43.9% (n=18) of the respondents did have a formal ticket return in place. 
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 Those respondents who did have a formal ticket return program were asked if the 
internally run ticket return program provided incentives for season ticket holders if unused 
tickets were returned to the ticket office and/or fundraising office.  All 18 respondents who 
had an internal ticket return program answered this question; 55.6% (n=10) did not provide 
an incentive and 44.4% (n=8) do provide incentives.  Seven of the respondents who indicated 
that their internal ticket return program provides incentives described those incentives as 
either a monetary credit, tax credit or donation credit.   
Research Question 4 
Q4 – What is the opinion of Football Bowl Subdivision ticket office officials 
regarding the online secondary ticket market? 
To address research question #4, survey participants were asked four questions.  Two 
questions asked the ticket office official whether or not the online secondary ticket market 
was an ethical way for consumers to obtain tickets, and for season ticket holders to resell 
tickets.   Forty survey participants answered these two questions (n=40).  The overwhelming 
majority (90%, n=36) thought the online secondary ticket market was an ethical way for 
consumers to obtain tickets for a sold out game, while 95% (n=38) thought the online 
secondary ticket market was an ethical way for season ticket holders to resell unused tickets.  
Ten percent (n=4) of ticket office officials did not believe the online secondary ticket market 
was an ethical way to obtain tickets, and five percent (n=2) did not believe it was an ethical 
way to resell unused tickets.  Respondents were not asked to describe why they perceived the 
online platform as ethical or unethical.   
 Survey participants were asked if legal contracts between an athletic ticket offices and 
online secondary ticket companies were an ethical source of revenue for collegiate athletic 
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departments.  Thirty eight ticket office officials responded (n=38).  Though the majority 
(71.1%, n=27) agreed that contracts were an ethical source of revenue, a smaller majority 
held this opinion, compared to the prior two questions; 28.9% (n=11) did not agree that 
contracts were an ethical source of revenue. 
 The last question sought the ticket office officials‘ opinions regarding their 
relationship with the online secondary ticket market.  Forty ticket office officials responded 
(n=40).  The majority (55%, n=22) did not have a formal contract with an online secondary 
ticket company and did not think the athletic department should pursue one.  Twenty percent 
(n=8) of respondents did have a formal contract, and did not believe it had either hurt or 
improved relationships with customers.  Five respondents (12.5%) did not have a formal 
contract, but believed the athletic department should pursue one.  No respondents indicated 
they had a formal contract and had a formal contract with an online secondary ticket 
company and believed it had hurt relationships with customers.  Table 4 provides the 
frequency and percentage of responses indicating the relationship between athletic 
departments and the online secondary ticket market. 
Table 5 
Athletic Department’s Relationship with the Online Secondary Ticket Market, and Opinion of 
That Relationship 
Relationship Percent Frequency 
No formal contract but 
believes should pursue 
one 
12.5% 5 
No formal contract and 
does not believe should 
pursue one 
55% 22 
Has formal contract 
and has improved 
12.5% 5 
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relationships with 
customers 
Has formal contract but 
has hurt relationship 
with customers 
0% 0 
Has formal contract 
with a company, and 
has neither hurt nor 
improved relationship 
with customers 
20% 8 
Research Question 5 
Q5 – Is there a relationship between NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision member 
institution‘s status with the online secondary ticket market and the ticket office 
official‘s opinion regarding the online secondary ticket market? 
In order to answer this question, the researcher ran a chi-square analysis between 
ticket office‘s statuses with the online secondary ticket market (research question 1) and 
ticket office official‘s opinions regarding the online secondary ticket market (research 
question 4).  In an effort to get statistically significant results, the status with the online 
secondary ticket market variable was collapsed into two categories: existence of a formal 
contract, or no existence of a formal contract.  This was cross-tabulated with the four 
variables regarding ticket office official‘s opinions: if the online secondary ticket market is 
an ethical way to obtain tickets; if it is an ethical way to resell unused tickets; if legal 
contracts with online secondary ticket companies are an ethical source of revenue for athletic 
departments; and their opinion on their athletic department‘s relationship with the online 
secondary ticket market. 
Only one of the criteria in the study produced significant results (p< 0.05).  There is a 
significant relationship between a ticket office‘s status with the online secondary ticket 
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market, and the ticket office official‘s opinion regarding contracts being an ethical source of 
revenue for an athletic department.  All respondents (100%) that had a formal contract with 
an online secondary ticket company indicated formal contracts are an ethical source of 
revenue for athletic departments.  Those who had no formal contract were more split in their 
opinions.  A slight majority (59.3%) indicated legal contracts are an ethical source of revenue 
for athletic departments, while 40.7% indicated they are not an ethical source of revenue.  
Please see Table 6. 
Table 6 
Relationship Between Status with the Online Secondary Ticket Market and Opinion on Legal 
Contracts as an Ethical Source of Revenue for Athletic Departments 
Status Agree (is an ethical source) Disagree (is not an ethical 
source) 
Formal Contract 100% 0% 
No Formal Contract 59.3% 40.7% 
Chi-Square Results:  N=38  p-value=.012 
 
 Although the remaining chi-square tests did not yield significant results, they did 
yield descriptive statistics.  All respondents (100%) who had a formal contract with an online 
secondary ticket company indicated the online secondary ticket market is an ethical way to 
obtain tickets.  Of those with no formal contract, 85.7% indicated it was an ethical way to 
obtain tickets, while 14.3% indicated it was not an ethical way to obtain tickets.  In addition, 
100% of respondents who had a formal contract indicated the online secondary ticket market 
is an ethical way to resell tickets.  Of those with no formal contract, 92.9% indicated the 
online secondary ticket is an ethical way to resell tickets, and 7.1% indicated it was not 
ethical to do so.  In both tests, results were based on 40 valid cases. 
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 There was a significant relationship (p<0.05) between the status with the online 
secondary ticket market and the ticket office official‘s opinion of that relationship, but 62.5% 
of the cells had an expected count less than 5.  Thus there is no significance.  However, there 
are descriptive statistics gained from the chi-square test.  The results were run using 39 valid 
cases, and are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Relationship Between Status with the Online Secondary Ticket Market and Opinion of that 
Relationship 
 Opinion of Relationship with Online Secondary Ticket Market 
 
Status 
No formal 
contract but 
should pursue 
one 
No formal 
contract and 
does not believe 
should pursue 
one 
Has formal 
contract and has 
improved 
relationship with 
customers 
Has formal 
contract and has 
neither hurt nor 
improved 
relationship with 
customers 
Formal Contract 0% 0% 41.7% 58.3% 
No Formal 
Contract 
18.5% 77.8% 0% 3.7% 
 
Research Question 6 
Q6 – Is there a relationship between sold out games per season in football and men‘s 
basketball, and NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision member institution‘s status with 
the online secondary ticket market? 
 No significant relationship (p> 0.05) was found between status with the online 
secondary ticket market, and sold out football and men‘s basketball games.  Again, in an 
effort to get statistically significant results through the chi-square anaylsis, the status with the 
online secondary ticket market variable was collapsed into two categories: existence of a 
formal contract, or no existence of a formal contract.  The sold out football games variable 
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was collapsed into two ranges: zero to four games sold out, and five to seven games sold out.  
Sold out men‘s basketball games variable was also collapsed into two ranges: zero to five 
games, and six or more games.   
 Though the chi-square analysis did not yield significant results, there were descriptive 
statistics to report.  The majority (58.3%) of ticket office officials who indicated they had a 
formal contract with an online secondary ticket company sold out zero to four football games 
during the 2009 season.  Of those with no formal contract, 77.8% sold out zero to four 
games. 
 Most (91.7%) ticket office officials with a formal contract with an online secondary 
ticket company indicated they sold out zero to five men‘s basketball games during the 2009-
10 season.  Of those with no formal contract, 77.8% sold out zero to five games.  Results are 
shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Relationship Between Status with the Online Secondary Ticket Market and Number of Games 
Sold Out in Football and Men’s Basketball 
 Sold Out Games 
 Football Men‘s Basketball 
Status 0-4 5-7 0-5 6 or more 
Formal Contract 58.3% 41.7% 91.7% 8.3% 
No Formal 
Contract 
77.8% 22.2% 77.8% 22.2% 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between the online 
secondary ticket market and NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision athletic departments.  The 
following chapter will discuss conclusions from the data in Chapter 4, make 
recommendations and suggest ideas for future research. 
The relationship between NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision ticket offices and the online 
secondary ticket market 
At one time, athletic teams tried to prohibit season ticket holders from reselling 
tickets, as discussed in NPS v. Stub Hub (NPS, LLC v. Stub Hub, Inc., 2007).  However, in 
2006, the value of tickets resold online was estimated to range from $2 to $6 billion 
(Johnson, 2007).  Those kinds of numbers make it difficult to ignore the potential revenue 
that can be gained from the online secondary market (Helyar, 2007).  In 2006, Ticketmaster 
reached an agreement to be Penn State‘s official online secondary ticket market partner—
giving Ticketmaster the first college athletic department contract in the company‘s history 
(Biertempfel, 2006).  By 2008, the online secondary ticket company StubHub had contracts 
with 14 NCAA athletic departments (―NCAA Basketball Tickets,‖ 2008).  Even the NCAA-
the defender of amateurism-has a formal agreement with the online secondary ticket 
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company RazorGator for the NCAA Men‘s Basketball Final Four (―NCAA Selects 
RazorGator,‖ 2006). 
The evolution of formal contracts with online secondary ticket companies at the 
college athletic department level is evident in this paper‘s research.  Although the researcher 
found the majority (70%) of athletic departments did not have a formal contract with an 
online secondary ticket company, the majority still indicated it was an ethical way to buy and 
resell tickets.  A percentage of athletic departments (30%) indicated they did have a formal 
contract for resale with a specific online secondary ticket company.  This indicates 
tremendous growth in this market and industry in a relatively short period of time.  
Why college athletic ticket offices have or do not have contracts with online secondary 
ticket companies 
According to Biertempfel (2006), many college athletic departments looking for new 
revenue streams view deals with online secondary ticket companies to be financially 
beneficial.  But, according to this paper‘s research, the majority of ticket office officials at 
FBS member institutions do not place absolute importance on the potential for added 
revenue. 
Existence of a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company  
Of the 30% of survey respondents that had a formal contract with an online secondary 
ticket company, 75% indicated strong to moderate importance to the added revenue 
generated from the contract.  However, only 8.3% indicated revenue as holding absolute 
importance (see Table 3).  The researcher believes that, although seeking new revenue 
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streams is important to college athletic departments, a formal contract with an online 
secondary ticket company has more purpose than just sponsorship money.     
 The ability for customers to buy and sell tickets held just as much importance among 
ticket office officials as did the potential for added revenue.  The internet has created a larger 
and more efficient marketplace and the repeal of many anti-scalping laws has made it 
possible for the online secondary ticket market to thrive (Nocera, 2008).  It is a convenient 
platform for buyers and sellers, and the majority of ticket officials surveyed also held this 
opinion.  The majority (75%) of respondents indicated strong to moderate importance on the 
ability for customers to acquire tickets through an official online secondary ticket company, 
and 83.3% indicated strong to moderate importance on the ability for season ticket holders to 
resell unused or unneeded tickets through an official online secondary ticket company (see 
Table 3).   
The researcher believes this shows an acceptance of the online secondary ticket 
market as a legitimate way for a college athletic team‘s fans to buy and resell tickets.  It 
could also mean that a contract with an online secondary ticket market is a way of fostering 
customer service.  Because the internet has created a more efficient marketplace, fans and 
customers may be more apt to utilize online methods of either reselling tickets they cannot 
use, or buying tickets (Nocera, 2008).  By creating an environment where customers and fans 
can buy or resell tickets through a specific online company, college athletic ticket offices are 
customizing their business to the needs of their customers.         
In fact, among all survey respondents-both those who did and did not have a formal 
contract- the percentages were more even regarding whether an internal ticket return program 
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existed, compared to the percentages of whether a formal contract with an online secondary 
ticket market existed.  Of all respondents surveyed, 43.9% had an internal ticket return 
program in place, while 30% had a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company. 
It was not measured whether or not the internal ticket return took the place of a formal 
contract with an online secondary ticket company, but it does show athletic ticket office 
officials recognize there is a need from a customer service standpoint to provide an option for 
customers to buy and resell tickets. 
No formal contract with an online secondary ticket company 
The majority of respondents (70%) did not have a formal contract with an online 
secondary ticket company.  The respondents were asked to indicate a degree of importance 
for four different statements for not having a formal contract with an online secondary ticket 
company.  There was no clear majority for any degree of importance for any of the four 
statements, but there are some interesting observations (see Table 4).  When asked to indicate 
the degree of importance on not having a formal contract because of anti-scalping legislation, 
66.6% percent indicated weak to no importance.  With the repeal of most state anti-scalping 
legislation (Jacoby, 2007), the fact that the majority indicated weak to no importance is not 
surprising.   
The results in Table 4 could signify that the other 33.4% of ticket office officials are 
not aware whether their state still has anti-scalping legislation, or the fact that anti-legislation 
used to exist is enough to deter them from seeking a contract with an online secondary ticket 
company.  Only a few states still have anti-scalping legislation, but there have long been 
arguments made by anti-scalping legislation proponents that legislation is necessary to ensure 
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public safety and fair access to tickets (Bell, 2006).  In Chapter 2, legal cases involving ticket 
scalping, or that helped set court precedent regarding ticket scalping were discussed.  As 
early as the case Nebbia v. New York in 1934, the courts found anti-scalping legislation to be 
lawful, as it was instilled to promote a public interest and promoted the public good (Bell, 
2006).  Regarding anti-scalping legislation, courts continued to recognize the state had a 
legitimate interest in protecting public welfare in terms of public access to tickets.  Just 
because anti-scalping legislation is repealed does not mean concerns over public safety and 
fair distribution of tickets are eliminated.  Certainly no ticket office official wants to be 
portrayed as condoning anything that would put their fans in an unsafe or unfair 
environment.  State legislatures passed laws curbing or prohibiting ticket scalping in 
reactions to the negative connotations with ticket scalping (Bell, 2006).  In the past, the word 
ticket scalper would invoke an image of burly men lurking outside stadiums selling fistfuls of 
tickets (―Free-market Fleecing,‖ 2006).  Not only was this dangerous from a public policy 
perspective, but also a buyer on the street had no idea whether or not the ticket was valid 
(Bell, 2006).  However, by using internet technology to bring the buyer and seller together, 
and by providing buyer guarantees, companies, such as StubHub, have created a safe, secure 
environment to exchange tickets (―Guarantee,‖ n.d.).  Now the consumer can purchase tickets 
in the comfort of his or her home and know the ticket-and the ticket buying platform-is 
legitimate.  Despite these secure measures, 33.4% of ticket office officials still place absolute 
to moderate importance on anti-scalping legislation as a reason for not having a formal 
contract with an online secondary ticket market.  This may show the perception of tickets 
purchased through the online secondary platform are likely to be fraudulent still exists among 
ticket office officials.  Again, just because the anti-scalping legislation was repealed does not 
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mean the reasoning behind it does, such as, protecting fans from fraudulent tickets.  Not all 
college athletic departments want to venture down a path that could lead to legal liability, or 
hurt their public image, the cost of which certainly would be greater than any sponsorship 
revenues from an online secondary ticket company. 
Another reason for anti-scalping legislation was to protect the consumer and 
promoter.  Again, a ticket priced below market value would help ensure a sell-out crowd and 
continue customer goodwill (Benitah, 2005).  According to Bell (2006), an increase in the 
ticket price charged by the scalper reflects negatively on promoters, whether or not they can 
control ticket scalping.  Based on this research, one would expect protecting consumer 
against high prices found through online secondary ticket sites would still hold strong 
importance among ticket office officials. 
But, the laws of supply and demand do not go away-with or without anti-scalping 
legislation.  Through this thesis‘ research, ticket office officials indicated they have come to 
accept the laws of supply and demand when determining the market-clearing price of a 
ticket.  The main reason scalpers exist is because demand for tickets exceeds the supply.  
When this occurs, a secondary market is created where those with the product can resell at 
the market-clearing price, and those who want to attend the event can still obtain tickets 
(Benitah, 2005).  The scope of the online secondary ticket market is global, and fans are 
more accepting of the online platform, because of the security and legitimacy some online 
secondary ticket companies can provide.  Further, online secondary ticket sites have exposed 
the futility of trying to prevent the growth of a market that is driven by the laws of supply 
and demand (Nocera, 2008). 
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An example in the college athletics world is when a game between conference 
opponents does not seem like a high-demand game in the pre-season.  But, through 
conference play, the game quickly transforms into a hot ticket if the two teams are competing 
for a top place finish in their division.  Those fans who got their tickets early through the 
ticket office all of a sudden have a more valued item—those fans who waited to get tickets, 
have a strong desire to attend the game, and are willing to pay over face-value can certainly 
choose to do so through the online secondary ticket market.  If the market-clearing price is 
above the face-value of the ticket, ticket office officials cannot do much to affect that law of 
demand, nor the range of people the internet reaches through its global scope. 
Protecting consumers against high prices charged through online secondary ticket 
sites did not hold a strong importance among ticket office officials as a reason for not having 
a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company.  When asked to indicate 
importance regarding protecting customers against high prices through online secondary 
ticket site, half placed weak to no importance regarding protecting consumers against high 
prices (see Table 4).  This is in stark contrast to the legal research in Chapter 2.  For most of 
the 20
th
 century courts upheld anti-scalping legislation on the grounds of the legislation 
reasonably promoting the public good, as found in Nebbia v. New York.  Further, in Gold v. 
DiCarlo, courts recognized the state had a legitimate interest in protecting public welfare in 
terms of public access to tickets and the public‘s safety (Gold v. DiCarlo, 1965).  The 
difference, however, between these early legal precedents and the way tickets are resold 
today, is more tickets are sold online, thus taking away the potential threats encountered if a 
customer bought tickets outside the venue from a street scalper.  The researcher believes 
protecting customers from the dangers of buying tickets through street scalpers, such as, 
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fraudulent tickets and intimidation from street scalpers, holds more importance than 
attempting to regulate the laws of supply and demand, as 74% of ticket office officials 
indicated absolute to moderate importance to protecting fans against fraudulent tickets sold 
through online secondary ticket sites. 
The fact that 74% indicated absolute to moderate importance in protecting fans 
against fraudulent tickets sold through online secondary ticket sites shows ticket office 
officials still hold the perception that fraudulent tickets are sold through online secondary 
ticket sites.  Certainly, there are many instances where customers are scammed by online 
ticket brokers, and are not able to enter an athletic event due to an invalid ticket.  However, 
companies such as StubHub now offer a ―Fan Protect Guarantee,‖ in an effort to eliminate 
fraudulent tickets being resold.  StubHub guarantees buyers that their tickets will be 
authentic, and that sellers will never be able to contact them directly.  StubHub guarantees 
the seller that they will receive payment for fulfilled orders and that buyers will never be able 
to contact them directly (―Guarantee,‖ n.d.).  StubHub‘s guarantees have eliminated both the 
potential for illegitimate tickets and intimidation by scalpers—both of which held concern 
among lawmakers and promoters regarding the public‘s safety.  Furthermore, once a formal 
contract is established with StubHub, the company will share transaction information with 
the athletic ticket office, giving the ticket office the ability to resolve any ticket issues (Wolf, 
2010).  The researcher believes those with no formal contracts place absolute to moderate 
importance on protecting fans from ticket fraud because they are unaware of the guarantees 
that online secondary ticket companies can provide. 
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Contracts with Online Secondary Ticket Companies Function as a Customer 
Service 
There is overwhelming acceptance of the online secondary ticket market as an ethical 
way for customers to buy and sell tickets, with 90% of all survey respondents indicating the 
online secondary ticket market is an ethical way for customers to obtain tickets for a sold out 
game, and 95% indicating it is an ethical way for season ticket holders to resell unused 
tickets.   
The researcher believes this data shows an acceptance among survey respondents 
regarding the online secondary ticket market as an ethical way for customers to buy and sell 
tickets.  One reason for the acceptance may be the repeal of many state anti-scalping laws.  
For 30% of respondents, the elimination of these laws has opened the door to pursue 
contracts with online secondary ticket markets.  Further, 66.6% indicated that anti-scalping 
legislation held weak to no importance as a reason why the athletic department did not have a 
formal contract (see Table 4). 
The researcher believes a formal contract is also a way to service customers, in 
addition to just a chance to obtain sponsorship revenue or ticket fees from online secondary 
ticket companies.  Contracts with online secondary ticket companies do provide sponsorship 
revenue (Biertempfel, 2006), but they also provides a safe and secure environment for 
customers to buy and sell tickets, thus alleviating the concern about ticket fraud.  In addition, 
buying and reselling tickets through an online secondary ticket company is relatively simple.  
If a season ticket holder cannot attend a game at the last minute, and is unable to call the 
ticket office to return the ticket, he or she can still recoup some of the ticket price by posting 
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it online.  A buyer, who found out he or she can attend the event at the last minute, is able to 
buy the ticket at the listed price, and, depending on the online company, even print the ticket 
at home.  Ticket office officials surveyed recognize this customer service need to make 
buying and reselling tickets possible.  Of those 30% with a formal contract, just as many 
ticket office official indicated absolute to moderate importance on revenues gained from 
online secondary ticket contracts (83.3%), as they did providing customers a place to buy and 
resell tickets (see Table 3).  In fact, even a higher percentage (91.6%) indicated absolute to 
moderate importance on providing season ticket holders a place to resell unused tickets 
through the online secondary ticket company.   
Ticket office officials acknowledge that not all season ticket holders will be able to 
attend every game.  They also acknowledge that not all fans of a team can afford to buy 
season tickets, although they may want to at least have the chance to purchase individual 
game tickets—even if it‘s through an online secondary ticket site.  Therefore, by creating a 
formal contract with an online secondary ticket company, ticket office officials are ensuring 
they provide the best customer service possible, as well as try to reach as many fans as 
possible.   
As Greg Shaheen, the NCAA senior vice president for basketball and business 
strategies, pointed out, many fans were already reselling Final Four tickets on the secondary 
ticket market, and the NCAA wanted to provide a safe, secure environment to do so through 
an official contract with RazorGator (Brown, 2008).  An extension of customer service is to 
provide a platform sanctioned by the athletic department to allow fans to buy and resell 
tickets in an environment that takes ticket fraud out of the equation. With StubHub‘s Fan 
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Protect Guarantee, the company will work with the customer to ensure tickets are authentic, 
and provides a full refund if something goes wrong.  Buyers are able to adjust their pricing 
based on the market, up until the time of sale, and are ensured full payment for all fulfilled 
ticket orders.  Furthermore, tickets bought through StubHub can be downloaded and printed 
right at your home (―Guarantee,‖ n.d.).  If this is how customers are buying and selling 
tickets, athletic departments can cater to their needs by providing access to an online 
secondary ticket site through the official athletic department web page, which ensures the 
tickets they buy off the online secondary ticket market are valid.  With added incentives such 
as sponsorship revenue and a percentage of ticket fees, creating a partnership with an online 
secondary ticket company makes sense from a business perspective.  As Diaz (2007) pointed 
out, if consumer demand exists and technology provides the means to enable it, it is nearly 
impossible to reverse the trend. 
Acceptance Does Not Translate into Practice 
There is still hesitation when it comes to establishing a formal contract between 
college athletic departments and an online secondary ticket company.  The majority of all 
survey respondents (70%) did not have a formal contract with an online secondary ticket 
company, and 55% of all survey respondents did not have a formal contract and did not 
believe their athletic department should pursue one.  The researcher believes there may be a 
‗not-in-my-backyard‘ mentality regarding the online secondary ticket market.  Of the 
respondents without a formal contract, 85.7% still indicated the online secondary ticket 
market was an ethical way to obtain tickets, and 92.9% indicated it was an ethical way to 
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resell unused tickets.  Regardless of the existence of a formal contract, ticket office officials 
accept the practice of buying and reselling tickets through the online platform.   
However, there is disparity in opinions between those who do and do not have formal 
contracts when asked if a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company is an 
ethical source of revenue for athletic departments.  All (100%) of ticket office officials who 
have a formal contract with the online secondary ticket market indicate such a contract is an 
ethical source of revenue for athletic departments.  But only 59.3% of ticket office officials 
who do not have a formal contract hold the same opinion (see Table 6).  This could indicate 
that, while it is ethical for customers to buy and resell tickets via the online secondary ticket 
market, ticket office officials who do not have a formal contract are divided over whether the 
athletic department should establish a formal contract to receive some of the profits and/or 
provide an online secondary ticket market platform for their customers.   
In Chapter 2 it was discussed that even anti-scalping legislation did not completely 
prevent ticket scalping from occurring around the arena, or online.  In fact, the futility of 
trying to stop scalping is one reason Criscuolo (1995) gives for why such laws have been 
repealed.  It is safe to say the respondents in this survey accept that fans will use the online 
secondary ticket platform to buy and resell tickets, no matter if a formal contract exists 
between the athletic department and the online company.  The fact that 59.3% of ticket office 
officials without a formal contract indicated it was not ethical to receive revenue from online 
secondary ticket companies could show there is resistance towards formal contracts with 
such companies.  Not surprisingly, once anti-scalping legislation began to be repealed in 
many states, professional sports organizations began forming contracts with online secondary 
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ticket companies as a way to receive revenue and provide a ticket exchange platform for fans.  
First, professional teams like the San Francisco Giants entered into formal contracts with 
online secondary ticket companies (Happel & Jennings, 2002).  This trend was followed by 
the professional leagues like Major League Baseball forming contracts with online secondary 
ticket companies (Jacoby, 2007).  But professional teams are always looking to fill the stands 
and generate as much revenue as possible.  What about NCAA member institutions?  The 
role of the NCAA and college athletic departments is to protect amateurism and provide 
scholarship opportunities.  The reason 59.3% of ticket office officials without a formal 
contract indicated it was not ethical to receive revenue from online secondary ticket 
companies may be a reflection of the struggle between maintaining the ideals of amateur 
athletics and succeeding financially in college athletics. 
Additionally, there is resistance towards formal contracts with an online secondary 
ticket company as an ethical source of revenue because college athletic departments always 
want to maintain a positive public image, and want to avoid being painted by media or 
watchdog groups as operating like a professional sports enterprise.  In 2008, the NCAA 
received bad press due to a deal with the online secondary company Firstdibz.com, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  After receiving such negative publicity, the NCAA cut its ties with 
the company (―NCAA Dissociates,‖ 2009).  The NCAA also received negative publicity 
from the New York Public Interest Group for their current contract with the online secondary 
ticket company, RazorGator, also discussed in Chapter 2.  While the NCAA maintains a firm 
stance against unregulated scalping, they also seek to capitalize on the success of the online 
secondary ticket market, sending a mixed message about their role as the defender of 
amateurism (Johnson, 2008).  College athletic departments certainly do not want to be 
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portrayed as acting in a profit-driven manner, nor portrayed as an institution that disregards 
the ideals of amateurism.     
Consumer Demand Gives Way to Consumers’ Demand 
The researcher found no significant relationship between the number of football and 
men‘s basketball sold out games and the ticket office‘s status with the online secondary ticket 
market (p>0.05).  For respondents with a formal contract, a under half (41.7%) sold out five 
to seven home football games in the 2009 season; only 8.3% sold out six or more home 
men‘s basketball games in the 2009-10 season (see Table 8).  In a ticket economy, demand 
almost always exceeds supply (Benitah, 2005).  According to the research by Criscuolo 
(1995), the secondary ticket market exists because people are willing to resell tickets to those 
fans that do not have them and are willing to pay the market clearing price of a ticket.  This 
helps to ensure that fans who want to attend an event have the opportunity to do so 
(Criscuolo, 1995).  But, based on this thesis‘ research, ticket offices-with or without a formal 
contract with an online secondary ticket company-seem to have plenty of supply on the 
primary market.  This prompts the question: why form a partnership with an online 
secondary ticket company, if consumer demand is not high from a ticket sales standpoint?   
The researcher believes the term ―consumer demand,‖ might not just mean consumer 
demand for the ticket.  Certainly, it would make sense if the majority of ticket offices with 
formal contracts sold out five to seven football games and six or more men‘s basketball 
games.  This could show that there is demand on the primary market-and potentially on the 
secondary market-warranting a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company 
where customers can buy and sell tickets based on the market-clearing price.  Instead, 
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―consumer demand‖ might mean the consumer demands efficiency and accessibility—which 
the online secondary ticket market provides.  ―Consumer demand‖ might mean consumers no 
longer want to pay the full season ticket cost to ensure a ticket to a highly-touted game, nor 
make large contributions to development offices to ensure a prime seat location.  
Additionally, customers may be more likely to buy season tickets if they know they can try to 
resell any unused tickets. 
Consumers demand to attend an athletic event on their terms.  They demand to 
acquire tickets on their time table; they demand to pay what they feel is reasonable for the 
location of the ticket; and they demand the chance to recoup their losses if they cannot attend 
a game.  Consumer demand for tickets has transformed into consumers‘ demands for 
accessibility and efficiency of athletic tickets in the free-market.  Some athletic departments-
as professional teams and the NCAA did previously-recognize this trend, and adapt as fans 
have become more accepting of the online secondary ticket market. 
Need for Revenue 
Intercollegiate athletics at the country‘s most prominent colleges and universities has 
become a multi-billion dollar enterprise, with a handful of the most visible athletics programs 
spending $80 million annually on operations.  This kind of money comes from donations, 
ticket revenue, royalties from championship events, licensing and sponsorship revenue and 
broadcast rights.  Most observers of college sports believe that the majority of athletics 
departments generate large net sums of money.  However, the vast majority of athletics 
programs do not make enough revenue to cover their expenses.  In a study by the NCAA, of 
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the then 119 FBS schools, 94% had a deficit for the 2007-08 school year, and averaged losses 
of $9.9 million (The Knight Commission, n.d.). 
FBS schools sponsor football, men‘s basketball, and at least 15 other sports.  There 
are also other costs: employees (coaches, administrators and sports medicine staff, to name a 
few) and an average of 500 student-athlete scholarships.  The greatest challenge facing 
athletic departments is dealing with the rapid rise of expenses, which includes university 
tuition fees for student-athletes; employee salaries; and potentially capital project debt.  At 
the same time, revenues are not keeping a similar pace.  In 2009, the NCAA published a 
report that found median operating spending for athletics increased 43% between 2004 and 
2008, but median revenue generated grew by only 33% over the same time period (The 
Knight Commission, n.d.).  This is all occurring at a time when many Americans are 
unemployed or tightening budgets. Thus, they are not able to make large donations to athletic 
development offices and are not able to afford season ticket prices (Schmidt, 2008). 
 Athletic departments around the country face difficult financial decisions.  When 
faced with rising operating costs, college athletic departments have two options: cut expenses 
(sports and/or employees), or find new revenue streams.  As discussed in this thesis, one 
source of revenue is a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company, in which 
sponsorship fees can be gained (Biertempfel, 2006).  For 30% of respondents in this thesis‘ 
research, a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company fit the needs of the 
athletic department, and what the athletic department felt was best for its customers.  This 
statement is reinforced by the fact that 100% of all ticket office officials who had a formal 
contract indicated it was an ethical source of revenue for athletic departments.  Every athletic 
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department around the county will need to ask important questions before entering into a 
formal contract with an online secondary ticket company, to ensure it is the best thing to do 
financially and philosophically.  Is this what our fans want and need?  Will a formal contract 
devalue a season ticket‘s value?  Will a formal contract provide much-needed revenue to 
keep up with rising operations?  The answers to these questions will vary from institution to 
institution, and opinions need to be weighed carefully before making a decision. 
Study Improvements 
Although this study‘s response rate was 32.8%, the quality of the sample is an issue.  
Due to IRB regulations, each respondent‘s survey answers were kept anonymous, thus not 
allowing the researcher to track each ticket office official‘s answers.  If this had been a 
possibility, it could shed some light on whether officials from certain conferences responded 
in a similar manner; whether officials from schools with well-known men‘s basketball or 
football programs responded in a similar manner; or whether officials from certain parts of 
the country responded in a similar manner.  Without this information, the researcher cannot 
know whether the sample is representative of the population. 
Further Research 
The researcher believes a formal contract with an online secondary ticket company is 
not just another revenue stream—it also provides a service to customers by making the 
buying and selling of tickets accessible and efficient.  However, this prompts a need for more 
research.  What are the opinions and relationships between the online secondary ticket 
market and college athletic fans?  Although ticket office officials believe the online 
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secondary ticket market is an ethical way to buy and sell tickets, and do not place a high 
importance on protecting customers from high prices found through online secondary ticket 
companies, the customers are the ones spending the money to attend the athletic event, 
navigating online secondary ticket sites, and paying any fees or percentages associated with 
the buying and selling of ticket on the online secondary ticket market.  To really measure 
how the existence of formal contracts with online secondary ticket markets affects consumer 
goodwill, further research is needed to gain the opinions of those who support college 
athletic departments through the purchase of athletic tickets.  
Further research is also needed to obtain information from other college athletic 
officials.  The survey in this study was sent to the highest-ranking ticket office official at 
each FBS member school.  However, the titles of these officials varied.  The titles ranged 
from ticket office manager to associate athletic director for corporate sales and ticket 
operations (see Table 1).  The role and perspective of an athletic department official whose 
job is to market the athletic department is different than that of a student-athlete development 
official, or a coach, or an athletic director.  An athletic director may have a perspective that is 
more concerned with the big picture implications of a contract with an online secondary 
ticket company, and how that could change the image of the athletic department.  A student-
athlete development official might be concerned over what message is conveyed to student-
athletes if the athletic department enters a formal ticket reselling contract.  While is against 
NCAA rules for the student-athlete to sell tickets on the online secondary ticket market, it is 
acceptable for the athletic department to condone the practice and receive revenue from a 
formal contract.  Ticket office officials represent just parts of athletic departments.  
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Therefore, more research is needed to understand the complete opinions from other officials 
regarding the relationship between college athletics and the online secondary ticket market. 
From a public policy perspective, one of the most common arguments in favor of 
anti-scalping legislation was the protection of customers, and prevention of price-gouging by 
ticket scalpers.  With the deregulation of anti-ticket legislation there still exists the potential 
for high ticket prices resold through the online platform.  At this point, with so many tickets 
being bought and resold through the online secondary ticket market, and formal contracts 
being established between college athletic departments and online secondary ticket 
companies, more research needs to be done on the implications this has on the distribution of 
tickets.  Do these factors lead to an unequal and unfair allocation of tickets?  Or should the 
rules of supply and demand determine the ticket price, as those rules determine the price of 
every other good bought and sold in our country? 
There is the perception that all tickets resold on the secondary ticket market are priced 
exorbitantly over the face-value of the ticket, therefore, only affordable to those with more 
money.  This perception exists for a reason, as one need only go to www.stubhub.com and 
find tickets on the secondary market for sale for the UNC versus Duke game at the Dean E. 
Smith Center in Chapel Hill for prices ranging from $419 to $3,500.  These are well above 
the face-value of the ticket: $45 to $65.  But, UNC men‘s basketball tickets for games at 
home also range from $4 to $555 (the home-opener versus Lipscomb University), and $11 to 
$555 (home game versus College of William & Mary).  More research is needed to 
determine the effects of the elimination of anti-scalping legislation and trend towards 
reselling tickets online have on ticket prices. 
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The online secondary ticket market is still a relatively new way of conducting 
business, as are contracts between companies and college athletic departments.  In the 
professional sports realm, once states began repealing anti-scalping legislation, legal cases 
began to be between fans and teams, instead of between fans and the state (Dreyer & 
Schwartz, 2007).  Although the researcher was unable to find any legal cases involving 
college athletics, one cannot rule out that such legal cases may occur.  If there are legal cases, 
then research will be needed to evaluate the impact of the court‘s decision has on the 
relationship between college athletics and the online secondary ticket market.  Also, there 
may be future litigation involving professional athletic organizations and the online 
secondary ticket market.  Court decisions made in such cases could impact college athletic 
departments and set a precedent that will impact their relationship with the online secondary 
ticket market. Therefore, there is a need for research on legal trends involving the online 
secondary ticket market and professional sports organizations. 
Closing Thoughts 
The relationship between college athletics and the online secondary ticket market is a 
significant one.  A formal contract with the online secondary ticket market can provide an 
opportunity for college athletic departments to generate revenue, and provide a ticket service 
for their fans and customers.  The decision whether to formally collaborate with an online 
secondary ticket company is not one to be entered into lightly.  Rather, each athletic 
department needs to assess their financial needs, and the needs of athletic ticket consumers.   
Athletic departments‘ needs for new revenue streams are not going to dissipate, and a 
close examination of their budget is needed to determine if a formal contract with an online 
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secondary ticket company makes financial sense.  This means looking at the cost of 
implementing the technology; training ticket office staff; and taking the time to educate fans 
on how to buy and resell tickets through the online platform.  Another important cost is how 
the formal contract with an online secondary ticket company is perceived among fans, local 
media and public interest groups.  Although this is more of a cost in terms of time and effort 
spent shaping the athletic department‘s message regarding a formal contract, it still has great 
importance.  Athletic departments need to maintain goodwill towards customers, and adapt to 
changes in technology, but also be sure they are not portrayed as professional sports 
organizations.  If implementation costs are minimal and the athletic department‘s image can 
be efficiently managed, then the revenues generated will most likely be worth the costs 
incurred.  If implementation costs—including the public image of the athletic department—
are deemed too risky, then the athletic department may need to re-examine other methods of 
reaching out to consumers and developing a system to offer fans who are trying to obtain 
tickets to a sold out event, or are trying to redistribute unused tickets. 
Ticket office officials in this study overwhelmingly indicated that the online 
secondary ticket market was an ethical way for consumers to obtain tickets for a sold out 
game.  They also overwhelmingly indicated it was ethical for season ticket holders to resell 
unused tickets through the online secondary ticket market.  Even though only 30% of 
respondents have a formal contract with an online secondary ticket market, this percentage is 
more than would have existed about ten years ago, which shows a trend towards formal 
contracts.  The job of each athletic department is to decide if a formal contract is the best 
thing to do from a financial and customer service standpoint.  It also needs to take a hard 
94 
 
look at how technology continually impacts the landscape of college athletics, and how the 
athletic department can adapt to these changes while still keeping in line with its mission. 
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